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WORKING 9 TO 5:  EMBRACING THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT THROUGH AN INTEGRATED 
MODEL OF PRISON LABOR 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The numbers are disheartening:  there were 2,293,157 prisoners in 
federal, state, and local jails and prisons in 2007.1  States used 38.2 billion 
dollars for correctional expenditures in 2001.2  Sixty-eight percent of state 
prisoners did not receive a high school diploma.3  The average 
recidivism rate of prisoners incarcerated for common crimes is 74.2%.4 
At the very least, these statistics suggest that the American prison 
system is dysfunctional.5  This dysfunction is indicative of the historical 
friction between the goals of imprisonment—punishment and 
rehabilitation—and the rights the Constitution guarantees to prisoners.6  
                                                 
1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).  At the time the Author of this Note 
obtained this information, the most current statistics were from 2007, reported in December 
2007.  Id.  The 2007 total number of incarcerated individuals increased by 1.5% from 2006.  
Id.   
2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/abstract/spe01.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).  This number represents a 145% 
increase from 1986 expenditures.  Id. 
3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/abstract/ecp.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).  The Department of Justice published 
this percentage in 2003.  Id. 
4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/abstract/rpr94.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).  This percentage is the average 
recidivism rate of prisoners incarcerated for the following crimes:  robbery, burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft, sale of stolen property, and possession, use, or sale of illegal 
weapons.  Id.  Unfortunately, the Bureau of Justice has not conducted a study of recidivism 
since 1994.  See id.  See also Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County, Ariz., in 
Phoenix, Ariz.  (Nov. 19, 2007).  The sheriff of the largest county in the country suggests the 
average recidivism rate among state and federal prisoners hovers around 60–65%.  Id. 
5 See Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content, and the Exigencies of War: American Prison 
Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962–1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 48 (1988).  Although prisons 
“hold, feed, shelter, accept, and release prisoners,” they also “beat, stab, rape, isolate, 
humiliate, terrify, inspect, objectify, disable, demoralize, brutalize, and discipline 
prisoners.”  Id.  While some of these functions are essential to prison administration, some 
of them obviously are not.  Id.  Willens explains why “prisons make prisoners” by stating: 
Prison rules and regulations, the day-to-day operation of the 
institution confront the inmate with an image of himself that is 
grotesque and absurd.  A prisoner who refuses to internalize this 
image, who insists upon seeing other versions of himself, is in constant 
danger.  Institutions exist separate from us, but when we internalize 
their existence the nature of the separation begins to change. 
Id. at 49 (quoting in part JOHN WIDEMAN, BROTHERS AND KEEPERS 183 (1984)). 
6 See infra Parts II.A–D (describing how the Supreme Court has struggled to balance the 
level of constitutional scrutiny it imposes on actions of prison administrators). 
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More specifically, four goals of imprisonment creating the tension are:  
punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and reform, or some varying 
combination.7 
The purpose of this Note is to methodically compile the history and 
case-law pertaining to prisoners’ rights, including Eighth Amendment 
claims, and apply it to the microcosm of prison labor.8  This Note 
proposes that throughout the history of imprisonment, administrators 
have placed primary importance on each of the aforementioned goals 
depending upon the circumstances of the times.9  Furthermore, this Note 
proposes that these goals of imprisonment can coexist peacefully in the 
twenty-first century and they can be balanced to form an integrated 
model for prison labor that meets constitutional scrutiny and exceeds the 
Nation’s expectations.10  Essentially, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
interpretation is a historical guide and an operational template to use 
and on which to expand; it is not a set of rules to circumvent.11 
Part II of this Note explores the history of prisoners’ rights in 
conjunction with the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.12  
It includes a brief look into prisoners’ rights in the new millennium and 
the direction the Court is taking regarding the constitutionality of prison 
labor.13  Part II concludes by describing six traditional models of prison 
labor and its use in prisons throughout the nation’s history.14  Next, Part 
III focuses on the traditional models of labor introduced in Part II and 
analyzes the wisdom of its usage from policy and constitutionality 
perspectives.15  Finally, Part IV introduces the framework for a 
previously nonexistent model code of prison labor, integrating the 
constitutional standards and policy goals of the traditional models and 
                                                 
7 See infra Part II.D (describing some current labor programs and their goals).  See also 
Willens, supra note 5, at 49 (explaining Michel Foucault’s theory that prisons are “essential 
machines and laboratories of social discipline[]”). 
8 See infra Parts II–III (recounting the history and constitutionality of prisoners’ rights 
and analyzing those guidelines as applied to prison labor). 
9 See infra Part II (explaining the periodic shifts in popular thought about the goals of 
imprisonment). 
10 See infra Part IV.B (outlining a proposed model code for the imposition of labor 
programs in prisons). 
11 See infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation of 
prisoners’ rights). 
12 See infra Parts II.A–C (explaining the ways in which the Court has applied these 
amendments to prisoners and the conditions of their confinement). 
13 See infra Part II.D (tying the Court’s reluctance to find any conditions unconstitutional 
into the reemerging “hands-off” mentality). 
14 See infra Part II.E (explaining how each model works, and describing examples of their 
use throughout history). 
15 See infra Part III (discussing the benefits and detriments of six traditional models of 
prison labor and their possible constitutional infirmities). 
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moving beyond them to create the possibility for many hybrid models of 
prison labor.16  Above all else, Part IV proposes that every able-bodied 
general population prisoner should work.17 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of 
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.18 
 
The history of prisoners’ rights in America is also a history of human 
emotion and necessity.19  When a person violates the societal code, 
Americans have demonstrated a desire for a sentencing system that 
focuses on punishment, retribution, rehabilitation, and reform.20  The 
need for the most cost-effective, time-effective, and space-conserving 
mode of justice has frustrated many people and has played an equal part 
in the history of prisons and the treatment of prisoners.21  Throughout 
time there have been very different penal notions, but perfecting the 
balance of the aforementioned pillars has been the common goal.22  Even 
though the goal may be unified, the systems utilized to achieve the 
proper balance have changed dramatically depending on how the courts, 
the public, prison administrators, and academics defined it.23 
                                                 
16 See infra Part IV (outlining briefly the operating guidelines for a variety of public and 
private sector programs). 
17 See infra Part IV.B (proposing that under the categorization of prisoners, only the most 
violent or ill offenders would be excluded from the work programs). 
18 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). 
19 See infra Part II.A (discussing public attitudes toward the purpose of incarceration). 
20 See infra Part II (describing the historical shifts in the primary goal of imprisonment 
from retribution to rehabilitation). 
21 See infra Part II.D (summarizing the Court’s current reluctance to pass judgment on 
the wisdom of prison management, despite their historical tendency to do so). 
22 See infra Part II (explaining that the Court has tried to balance constitutionally 
guaranteed rights with the need for effective prison administration). 
23 See infra Part II.  The forces affecting prison administration include court attitudes, 
internal prison administration, and public perception.  See infra Parts II.A–D (focusing on 
the interplay between the courts, the public, and prison administrators).  The ultimate 
penological goal of finding the correct balance between punishment, retribution, and 
rehabilitation is timeless.  See infra Parts II.A–D (recounting the shifting popularity of 
punishment, retribution, reform, and rehabilitation as the primary objective of 
imprisonment).  However, different balances have been struck at specific time-periods in 
American history.  See infra Part II.A–D (breaking up the history of prisoners’ rights into 
historical eras).  This Note focuses specifically on the balance as it relates to prison labor.  
See Parts II.E, III, and IV (explaining, analyzing, and expanding on traditional prison labor 
models). 
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This Part delves into the history of the goals, the means used to 
achieve them, and the influencers of penology from the inception of the 
Constitution to the present.24  The attitudes of the courts and the public 
regarding appropriate conditions of confinement for prisoners directly 
impacted the imposition of hard labor as a component of sentencing.25  
Furthermore, the continuing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment by 
the courts has oscillated between restraining the meaning to that 
intended by the Framers and expanding it to include a wider variety of 
punishments and conditions.26  During the Nation’s infancy, the 
attitudes of the judiciary, reflected through the holdings of the courts, 
were largely premised on a fear of past atrocities committed in England, 
coupled with a strong legacy of corporal punishment.27  In fact, a 
sentence of hard labor was the preferential means throughout the 
nineteenth century to achieve the goal of punishment.28  At the cusp of 
the twentieth century, however, prison labor fell out of favor with both 
the courts and the public.29  Through a methodical analysis of pertinent 
constitutional amendments and their application throughout history, this 
Part summarizes the rights afforded and denied to prisoners over the last 
two centuries and the models used to imprison men at hard labor, which 
will be the focus of the remainder of the Note.30 
A. The First Hundred Years 
From this Nation’s inception, there was little debate about the 
inclusion of the Eighth Amendment to the Bill of Rights.31  In the outer 
                                                 
24 See infra Part II notes and accompanying text (dividing the history of prisoners’ rights 
into eras focusing on punishment, reform, equality of process, and abstinence pertaining to 
prison administration issues). 
25 See infra Part II.A (describing the Court’s lackadaisical attitude about the treatment of 
prisoners in the late 1700s and early 1800s). 
26 See infra Part II.C (explaining that the Court started expanding the definition of cruel 
and unusual punishment in unprecedented ways, and noting that the peak of that 
expansion occurred in the 1960s). 
27 See infra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the events surrounding the 
Bloody Assize of 1685 and other sources of the traditional definition of “cruel and unusual 
punishment”). 
28 See infra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting the Court’s original attitude toward 
imprisonment that the decisions of jailers should not be questioned). 
29 See discussion infra Part II.B (describing late nineteenth and twentieth century 
attitudes promoting the idle confinement of prisoners, perhaps as a result of prison labor’s 
connection to slavery). 
30 See discussion infra Part II (after outlining the standards the Supreme Court has 
identified in analyzing questions relating to prison rights, Part II outlines six traditional 
models of prison labor). 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Eighth Amendment provides:  “Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  Id.  
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ambit of the Framers’ consciousness were the memories of atrocities that 
took place in England under the rule of King William and Queen Mary 
of the Stuart dynasty, such as the Bloody Assizes of 1685.32  In fact, the 
language of the Eighth Amendment was substantially copied from the 
language of the English Act of Parliament in 1688.33  The adoption of a 
                                                                                                             
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368–69 (1910).  Only two representatives, Mr. 
Smith and Mr. Livermore, opposed the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, both on the 
grounds that the language was too indefinite and lacked meaning.  Id.  Mr. Livermore 
commented: 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which 
account I have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in 
it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unusual punishment is 
to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often 
deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in 
future, to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they 
are cruel? 
Id. at 369.  See also Tessa M. Gorman, Note, Back on the Chain Gang:  Why the Eighth 
Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
441, 462 (1997) (discussing the development of the Eighth Amendment).  Before the 
colonies became a nation, the Virginia colony incorporated a prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishments in its constitution.  Id.  Furthermore, the federal government 
included the clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.  Id.; Yale Glazer, Note, The Chains 
May Be Heavy, but They Are Not Cruel and Unusual:  Examining the Constitutionality of the 
Reintroduced Chain Gang, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1195, 1202 (Summer 1996) (describing that 
Virginia’s Declaration of Rights contained the exact words prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment as did the English Bill of Rights of 1689). 
32 Weems, 217 U.S. at 371.  See James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead:  Warehouse Prisons, 
Paradigm Change, and the Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (1997).  The Bloody 
Assizes refers to a series of trials for treason in which those convicted were burned, 
disemboweled, beheaded or sentenced to other particularly gruesome forms of death.  Id.  
The heads of the executed prisoners were often displayed on poles for the townspeople to 
see.  Id. 
33 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).  The act, titled “An act for declaring the rights 
and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown” stated: 
[E]xcessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal 
cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the 
subjects, and excessive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel 
punishments inflicted . . . excessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Id. (quoting 1 St. Wm. & Mary, c. 2).  See Robertson, supra note 32, at 1009.  Blackstone, 
widely read by the delegates of the state conventions, vilified other types of barbarous 
punishment as well.  Id. at 1009.  Further examples of punishments intended to be 
prohibited include:  cutting off ears or hands, branding, placing prisoners in the pillory or 
rack, and any other form of “lingering death.”  Id. at 1009–10. 
See also Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment:  Whipping Offenders in the 
United States, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 403, 410 (1995).  Long before the English Bill of Rights, 
legal documents contained the notion of proportionality in sentencing.  Id.  For example, 
the Bible mandated lex talionis, or “eye for an eye,” in Leviticus.  Id. (quoting Leviticus 
24:19–20).  See also Gorman, supra note 31, at 459–60.  In addition to Biblical mandates for 
punishment, Greek philosophers and the Magna Carta, to name a few, discuss proper 
punishments for crimes.  Id. 
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prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment referred specifically to 
tortures such as crucifixion, the thumb-screw, disemboweling, burning 
at the stake, and other methods of punishment that caused death or the 
lingering fear of death.34 
The simplicity of the Amendment was clear in the minds of early 
justices.  Therefore, few courts have interpreted the Eighth Amendment 
and prisoner’s constitutional rights.35  The first Supreme Court opinion 
concerning prisoners’ rights in 1809 did not mention the Eighth 
Amendment specifically, but made clear the prevailing notion of judicial 
restraint regarding matters of prison administration, even at this early 
stage in the Republic.36  Sixty-nine years later, in 1878, the Court refused 
to limit states and territories to the congressionally prescribed method of 
death by hanging for capital offenses, thus allowing states and territories 
latitude in preferring methods of execution without necessarily violating 
the Eighth Amendment.37 
In 1868, the inclusion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution made the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states, 
although in practicality it had little effect on the judiciary’s 
interpretations because most states already had similar prohibitions on 
                                                 
34 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446.  See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE 
ASYLUM:  SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 46–50 (1971).  Colonial New 
England provided for many different and sometimes innovative punishments for various 
crimes.  Id.  For example, while banishment, whipping, and imposition of a fine were 
popular, a convict may also have been sentenced to stand at the gallows with a noose 
around their neck for a number of hours.  Id. at 48.  Notably, convicted criminals were 
rarely sentenced to imprisonment as jails were used solely for those awaiting trial.  Id. 
35 See infra note 36 (quoting the brief opinion in the first case to squarely address prison 
administration). 
36 Ex Parte Taws, 23 F. Cas. 725 (1809).  The entirety of the opinion read as follows: 
We do not think it right to interfere with the jailer in the exercise of the 
discretion vested in him, as to the security of his prisoners; unless it 
appeared that he misused it for purposes of oppression, of which there 
is no evidence in this case. 
Id.  From the affidavits, it appeared that Taws had made threats to escape, and as a 
consequence the jailer restricted Taws to his room and denied him access to the yard.  Id.  
However, the Court eluded that if a jailer misused his authority for the purpose of 
oppression, the Court may interfere.  Id.  See infra Part II.C.  This “hands off policy” would 
disappear and reemerge in the next two centuries.  See infra Part II.C. 
37 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1878).  A man duly convicted of first-degree 
murder in the Territory of Utah was sentenced to be “publicly shot until [he was] dead” in 
accordance with the laws of Utah.  Id. at 131.  The first national crimes act of Congress 
provided for death by hanging for capital offenses.  Id. at 133.  The Court held that 
Congress did not intend the statute to supersede the power of the states in deciding the 
proper method of execution.  Id.  In keeping with the spirit of the Eighth Amendment, the 
Court was not concerned with other provisions of the state law at issue that called for 
imprisonment at hard labor during a life sentence, in lieu of a death sentence duly entered 
by a jury.  Id. at 136. 
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cruel and unusual punishment in their own constitutions.38  However, 
the Fourteenth Amendment did signal the Court’s forthcoming—even if 
only temporary—desire for uniformity of punishment amongst the states 
by requiring a grievance procedure for prisoners in accordance with due 
process of law.39 
The constitutionality concerning the imposition of hard labor on a 
convicted criminal was squarely addressed and upheld in two late-1800s 
cases, thus reaffirming the limited scope of the phrase “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”40  The Court drew a fine distinction between cases 
where hard labor must be part of the punishment by statute and cases 
where imprisonment alone was required by statute.41  A minute 
statutory distinction made a large difference to prisoners when the Court 
held that lower courts may, at their discretion, sentence a convict to 
serve out his punishment in a penitentiary where hard labor is incident 
to discipline at the institution.42  As a result, the distinction drawn in 
these cases allowed punishment through hard labor to be imposed even 
                                                 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Pertinent portions of Section 1 provide: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Id.  See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446–47.  In Kemmler, the Court did not explicitly apply the 
Eighth Amendment to the states, but instead relied on the New York Constitution of 
substantial similarity in upholding the state’s right to find that electrocution was a more 
humane method of imposing death than hanging.  The Court noted that the interpretation 
of the New York Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment would be 
“equally true of the [E]ighth [A]mendment, in its application to [C]ongress.”  Id.  See also 
Gorman, supra note 31, at 464.  The Court rejected the argument that “novel” punishment is 
the same as “unusual” punishment.  Id. 
39 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s increasingly uniform treatment of federal 
and state prisoners).  See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding that 
prisoners are guaranteed similar Due Process rights as citizens accused of a crime). 
40 Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396, 399 (1877) (stating that when imprisonment at hard 
labor is prescribed by statute as part of a punishment, the court is without discretion; 
however, if it is not prescribed by statute, the court has discretion to sentence the criminal 
to an institution that uses hard labor as a method of discipline);  In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 
266 (1890) (noting that punishments for a term greater than one year may be served at an 
institution that employs hard labor if the statute does not prescribe otherwise). 
41 Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. at 399.  The Court has discretion to impose imprisonment 
at hard labor when the statute is silent on the issue.  Id. 
42 United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 60–61 (1894).  The Court relied on the former 
opinions to uphold the sentence of a convicted horse-stealer, which provided for 
imprisonment of five years in an Ohio state penitentiary that employed “hard labor” in the 
usual course of discipline.  Id. at 50, 61. 
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if not prescribed by statute.43  In the Court’s fervency for punishment, it 
even extended the constitutional imposition of hard labor to many 
consecutive sentences that, when aggregated, led to shockingly severe 
punishments for multiple petty crimes.44 
By the close of the nineteenth century the Court had expressly 
approved of confinement at hard labor in a number of circumstances, 
leaving a wide range of acceptable punishments to lower courts to meet 
the varying circumstances of each case.45  The penological goals were 
changing, however, and the conditions were set for the implementation 
of the big house. 
                                                 
43 See id;  Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. at 399.  But see Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428–
29 (1885), which cites Sir William Blackstone’s commentary that infamous punishments 
include confinement to hard labor and further delineates that infamous punishments are 
not limited to those that are cruel and unusual.  Id. (citing 4 Bl. Comm. 377).  Therefore, 
imprisonment at hard labor, an infamous punishment, violates the Constitution.  Id. at 429.  
Perhaps foreshadowing later decisions, Wilson implies that changes in public opinion over 
the ages may also change what punishments shall be considered infamous.  Id. at 427. 
44 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331–35 (1892).  In O’Neil, the Court dismissed the 
writ of error because the question posed did not even raise a federal question.  Id. at 335.  
The imposition of a sentence of 19,914 days confinement at hard labor for 457 offenses of 
selling intoxicating liquor—three days for each dollar of the unpaid fine originally 
imposed—was not deemed cruel and unusual because the “unreasonableness is only in the 
number of offenses which the respondent has committed.”  Id. at 325, 331. 
45 Pridgeon, 153 U.S. at 61.  See ROTHMAN, supra note 34, at 237.  Imprisonment in the first 
half of the 1800s meant institutionalization in asylums.  Id.  Asylums sought to treat 
prisoners as patients, and imprisonment as medicine.  Id. at 133.  Rothman describes the 
organization and goals of the asylum: 
Create a different kind of environment, which methodically corrected 
the deficiencies of the community, and a cure for insanity was at hand.  
This, in essence, was the foundation of the asylum solution and the 
program that came to be known as moral treatment.  The institution 
would arrange and administer a disciplined routine that would curb 
uncontrolled impulses without cruelty or unnecessary punishment.  It 
would re-create fixity and stability to compensate for the irregularities 
of the society.  Thus, it would rehabilitate the casualties of the system. 
Id.  By the second half of the century, however, the asylum was failing and 
institutionalization “decline[d] from rehabilitation to custodianship[.]”  Id. at 239.  See also 
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 67 (1982).  After the 
Civil War, a new penology developed, motivated to fix the problems of the asylum.  Id.  
The main problem with the asylum, as they saw it, was that prisoners were sentenced to a 
fixed term, resulting in a lack of motivation to reform.  Id.  To remedy this, the new 
penology advocated indeterminate sentencing.  Id.  Prisoners sentenced to an 
indeterminate time in a penitentiary would supposedly have greater motivation to 
“reform” because positive actions would decrease their sentence.  Id.  Indeterminate 
sentencing remains a cornerstone of the penal system today.  Id. 
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B. The Fall of Prisoner Labor 
Though some academics advocated a new type of prison they called 
the Reformatory, the public, more confident by the Court’s confirmation 
of the constitutionality of tough treatment like hard labor and various 
modes of execution, preferred mass institutions to satisfy a growing 
public desire for punishment.46  Penologists, who saw criminal deviance 
as a social contagion, sought to cure it through a diet of solitude, labor, 
and contemplation; however, it is unclear whether they viewed it as 
punishment, rehabilitation, or both.47 
The labor portion of the penologists’ cure took the form of both 
public and private hiring of prisoners through a system of peonage.48  
                                                 
46 Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012.  The public increasingly viewed criminal deviance as 
a “familial defect” and a “failure of upbringing.”  Id. at 1011.  In an effort to regain social 
control after the chaos of the Civil War, the most notorious of prisons, including Auburn 
Prison in New York and Pennsylvania’s Eastern and Western Penitentiaries, were built.  Id.  
See Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoner’s Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 350 (1998).  (noting that 
Pennsylvania’s “‘silent’[ ] system” kept inmates confined in separate cells, working in 
silence for the dual purpose of containing the contagion of deviance and instilling 
discipline to keep “evil thoughts” at bay); Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the 
Exigencies of War:  American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 70 
(1987).  Unexpectedly, this silent system, developed by the Quakers, drove prisoners 
insane.  Id.  In contrast, while Auburn prisoners also worked in silence, they worked 
collectively.  Id.  To maintain order, however, wardens were often violent, and the violence 
required to make the Auburn model work led many to deem the model a failure in terms of 
its ability to reform prisoners.  Id. 
47 Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012.  Robertson discusses the shift in popularity from 
corporal punishment to imprisonment in warehouse prisons that “squander human 
potential. [ ] . . . offer[ing] an existence, not a life. . . . storing and recycling offenders.”  Id. at 
1005–07.  He concludes that warehousing is a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 
1007.  See also SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME 179 (1998); LOUIS N. 
ROBINSON, PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 159 (1921).  The Elmira Reformatory of post-
civil war is typical of the structure of the reformatory movement.  CHRISTIANSON, supra, at 
179.  At Elmira, all inmates entered on the same level and were reevaluated every six 
months for progress.  Id.  As they progressed, inmates moved through three levels, each 
with increased privileges.  Id.  An inmate progressed by making satisfactory “grades” on a 
number of activities and learning experiences designed to take the inmate from prisoner to 
productive member of society.  Id.  However, one scholar examining the system deemed 
one-half of inmates “incorrigible,” attributing their lack of progress to heredity.  Id. 
48 Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45.  Two systems called the “state-use” system and the 
“contract” system were particularly prevalent.  Id.  The state-use system allowed the sale of 
prison-made goods to state markets and the imposition of “public-works” projects staffed 
by prisoners, and is still used today.  Id.  The contract system allowed the sale of prisoners’ 
labor to private firms while maintaining state control over custody, care, and discipline.  Id. 
at 345.  See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158–59.  Private parties were unable to compete with 
contractors’ low prices.  Id.; see also BLAKE MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 94 (1974) (The 
Univ. of Chicago 1938).  The growing movement of organized labor strongly opposed the 
contract system:  by the 1880s, the National Labor Party, the Knights of Labor, and the 
Federation of Organized Trades and Labor, had anti-contract clauses as part of their 
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Although peonage systems were enormously popular, the Court defined 
“peonage” in 1905 as indebtedness and denounced it as servitude in 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.49  The Court reinforced the 
declaration of the Thirteenth Amendment in several cases and, while 
maintaining that convicted criminals can be subjected to involuntary 
servitude as a condition of confinement, suggested that the practice of 
hiring out convicts to private parties may amount to involuntary 
servitude.50  Until this time, prisons utilized the practice widely to 
provide the mutual benefits of cheap labor to private industry and 
additional funds to penitentiaries.51 
                                                                                                             
platform.  Id.  See George E. Sexton, Franklin C. Farrow & Barbara J. Auerbach, The Private 
Sector and Prison Industries, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. Of Justice, Washington, D.C.), 
Aug. 1985 at 1 for further information about the popularity of anti-contract clauses. 
49 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905).  Clyatt was convicted of 
unlawfully and knowingly returning persons to a condition of peonage by forcibly 
returning them to his firm to pay off their debt.  Id. at 214.  The Court did not flinch at his 
sentence of four years’ confinement at hard labor, and strongly condemned the practice of 
peonage as a violation of the prohibition on servitude, whether voluntary or involuntary.  
Id.  See generally  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.  The Thirteenth Amendment declares: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Id. 
50 Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 218–19.   In addition to Clyatt, the Court found unconstitutional 
conditions of peonage in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911), and United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914).  Reynolds was similar to Clyatt in that the Court 
condemned the condition of private peonage.  Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146–47.  In Reynolds, a 
private person was allowed to confess judgment for another and post surety for him in 
return for a term of labor to pay off the debt.  Id. at 139–40.  If, however, the laborer refused 
to work before the debt was paid off, he was returned to jail, where he could again be 
confessed to judgment by another and placed in the same manner of indebtedness, likely 
for a larger amount of money.  Id.  The Court rejected the theory of voluntary contract and 
stated that “the convict is thus kept chained to an everturning [sic] wheel of servitude” in 
constant fear of being re-imprisoned.  Id. at 146–47.  The Court compared the nineteen 
months of servitude under the system of surety with the maximum of four months at hard 
labor that would be imposed by the state and found the disparagement disgusting.  Id. at 
147–48. 
 In contrast, Bailey involved a law that made it a crime to break a ‘contract’ to work to 
repay a debt, punishable by imposing a fine double the damage of the lender in 
conjunction with a period of imprisonment at hard labor.  Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228.  The Court 
held that the law amounted to involuntary servitude and stated, “[t]he state may impose 
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor 
for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the 
service or pay the debt.”  Id. at 244. 
51 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 157 (1993).  
The oldest system in America, with its roots in English prison farms, is the “leasing 
system”.  Id.  See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156–57.  Under the lease system, a private 
entity pays the government a sum of money in return for possession of a prisoner; thus, the 
lease system puts prisoners entirely in the control of private parties.  Id.  The lessee owns all 
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By 1900, however, privatized prison labor was becoming unpopular 
in America primarily for economic reasons.52  Firms that did not contract 
with prisons were unable to compete with those that did.53  Although 
admittedly less important to most Americans, escalating data of prisoner 
brutality alarmed a vocal portion of the public.54  Additionally, 
legislators and academics took signals from the Court when it intimated 
the possible unconstitutionality of contracting prisoners for labor.55  The 
continuing backlash of the slave era coupled with ideas of a new 
morality ushered out a fiscally responsible and economically beneficial 
alternative to continuous confinement to a cell.56 
C. Carving Out the Rights of Prisoners 
1. Weems v. United States57 
The seminal case that attempted to define cruel and unusual 
punishment is Weems v. United States.58  The Court struck down the law 
                                                                                                             
goods and services the prisoner produces and is also responsible for the prisoner’s basic 
needs.  Id. at 158; see Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245 (1911) (holding that a law making it a crime to 
break a contract to work to repay debt is tantamount to involuntary servitude).  See 
alsoCHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 181.  The system was very popular in the early days of 
the Union, but fell out of favor when the Supreme Court linked the practice to slavery.  Id. 
52 See infra note 53 (describing the public concern that prison-manufactured goods 
would put free labor manufacturers out of business). 
53 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 172–74.  The Commissioner of Labor’s statement in 1905 
clarifies why free labor industries fought to eliminate prison labor:  “In several industries, 
as stove hollow ware, saddletrees, and certain kinds of whips and whiplashes, the prison-
made goods have entirely or practically driven the products of free labor from the market.”  
Id.at 172 (quoting Twentieth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor at 49 (Washington, 
1905)).  See Sexton, supra note 48, at 6.  In fact, during the depression, Congress passed laws 
prohibiting prison-made goods from being transported interstate in an effort to destroy 
competition with free labor.  Id. at 6.  See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (discussing 
the qualifications for becoming certified to transport prison-made goods interstate). 
54 Garvey, supra note 46, at 358, 363.  One particularly damning story involved a man 
who was convicted of a relatively minor crime of vagrancy and leased to a company to 
strip turpentine for ninety days.  Id. at 363.  Unable to keep pace in the hip-deep mud, he 
was beaten to death.  Id. at 364.  See infra Part II.E (providing examples of prisoner brutality 
under the lease system). 
55 See infra Part II.E (describing that the leasing system and similar systems of surety 
have strong ties to involuntary servitude). 
56 See supra notes 50–53 (explaining the factors leading to the decline of prison labor).  
But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 159.  Despite the decline of prison labor, prison 
populations continued to increase.  Id.  Friedman notes that, “[i]mprisonment was and 
remained the basic way to punish men and women convicted of serious crimes.”  Id. 
57 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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outlining Weems’s fifteen-year sentence on the grounds that it violated 
the Eighth Amendment.59  In 1910, for the first time, the words “cruel 
and unusual” were extended beyond methods of corporal punishment to 
include a prohibition on sentences that were “so disproportionate” to the 
offense.60  Furthermore, the Court employed the principle of a living 
Constitution to work elasticity into an otherwise rigid Amendment.61  At 
the same time, the Court stressed the importance of judicial restraint in 
deferring to the legislature to adopt penal laws that are congruous with 
the gravity of the crime.62  In Weems, the Court managed to 
                                                                                                             
58 Id.  Weems actually involved the Philippine Penal Code; the Philippines were a 
territory of the United States at the time.  Id. at 357.  The complaint alleged that Weems 
embezzled from the government by entering wages as paid out to employees when the 
wages were not actually paid.  Id. at 357–58.  The imprisonment was to be served at a penal 
institution where he would work to benefit the state.  Id. at 364.  The imprisonment was 
termed cadena temporal, the third highest in severity.  Id. at 364.  The absolute highest 
penalty was of course death, and the second highest was cadena perpetua, or life 
imprisonment.  Id.  Furthermore, under the classification of his sentence, he was required to 
wear chains at the ankles and wrists and perform hard and painful labor, and was further 
prohibited from outside contact.  Id. 
In addition to the penalty while imprisoned, Weems was further condemned to a 
perpetual limitation of his liberty by requirements that authorities have constant notice of 
his domicile and employment.  Id.  The Court, in particularly passionate language, 
described the severity of Weems’s loss of liberty: 
He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within 
voice and view of the criminal magistrate . . . .  He may not seek, even 
in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his fall from 
rectitude.  Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to 
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone 
walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential 
liberty. 
Id. at 366.  Interestingly, the Court’s only mention of labor in regards to the law was that 
“painful labor” must be more than “hard labor,” though it did not know exactly what that 
meant.  Id. 
59 Id. at 382.  Weems was an officer of the Bureau of the Coast Guard and was convicted 
of falsifying public documents with the intent to defraud the United States government and 
sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment.  Id. at 357.  The Court held the law 
unconstitutional, though it recognized that the punishment has “no fellow in American 
legislation” and comes from a “government of a different form[.]”  Id. at 377. 
60 Id. at 368.  The Court did recognize the novelty of the Philippine Code in providing for 
an elastic sentencing system of minimum, medium, and maximum sentences, which is 
used almost universally among the states today.  Id. at 365. 
61 Id. at 373.  The Court’s new paradigm is evidenced by phrases such as “[t]ime works 
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  Therefore a principle, to be 
vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.”  Id. 
62 Id. at 379.  The Court explained this restraint as a “subordination of the judiciary to the 
legislature”: 
However, there is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the 
legislature.  The function of the legislature is primary, its exercise 
fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be 
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simultaneously reaffirm the notion of deference to legislators and prison 
administrators regarding sentencing and imprisonment while vastly 
expanding the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment to include the 
notion of proportionality in sentencing.63 
Expectedly, the expansion of the Eighth Amendment led to a flood of 
applications for writs of habeas corpus because, for the first time, the 
Supreme Court gave prisoners viable claims.64  Despite growing 
procedural difficulties with the inundation of writs, the Court upheld the 
importance of prisoners’ access to the courts.65  As the once popular idea 
of prisoners as social contagion waned, a new era began that extended 
unprecedented rights to prisoners. 
                                                                                                             
interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom or 
propriety.  They have no limitation, we repeat, but constitutional ones, 
and what those are the judiciary must judge.  We have expressed these 
elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not 
recognize to the fullest the wide range of power that the legislature 
possesses to adapt its penal laws to conditions as they may exist, and 
punish the crimes of men according to their forms and frequency.  We 
do not intend in this opinion to express anything that contravenes 
those propositions. 
Id. 
63 Id. at 373.  The pleadings contained no allegations of unconstitutionality based on the 
Eighth Amendment and the Court dispensed with that potentially fatal problem and 
instead decided the case on exactly those grounds, to which Justice White dissented.  Id. at 
383.  He argued that the majority incorrectly decided the case because  
[n]either at the trial in the court of first instance nor in the supreme 
court of the Philippine Islands was any question raised concerning the 
repugnancy of the statute defining the crime and fixing its punishment 
to the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights, forbidding cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
Id. (White, J., dissenting). 
64 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 301 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  As an example, 
in the decade spanning 1937 to 1947, six prisoners at Alcatraz filed sixty-eight petitions, 
and in a five year period in the District of Columbia, one prisoner filed fifty petitions.  Id. at 
301 n. 4.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004).  “[H]abeas corpus” literally 
translates from Latin to “that you have the body.”  Id.  A writ of habeas corpus is often 
used to challenge the legality of one’s imprisonment by bringing that person before a court.  
Id. 
65 Compare Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 482, 484–90 (1969) (holding that prison regulations 
barring inmates from helping other inmates form habeas corpus claims are 
unconstitutional regardless of the impact on prison discipline), with Price, 334 U.S. at 269–
94 (holding that the proper court may issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring the presence 
of a prisoner whenever it deems it necessary in the interests of justice).  In particular, Price 
involved a prisoner whose claim was rejected, after requesting a writ four times, because 
he failed to state a cognizable claim leaving the lower court no power to compel Price to 
come before the court.  Price, 334 U.S. at 270, 276.  The Supreme Court held that it could 
compel the prisoner to come before the court and appointed a member of the bar of the 
Supreme Court to be his counsel.  Id. at 278. 
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2. Trop v. Dulles66 
The second landmark case involving the Eighth Amendment was 
Trop v. Dulles.67  Under a law that forfeited the citizenship of convicted 
wartime deserters, the Court considered whether denationalization by 
an act of Congress could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.68  The 
Court struck down the law and announced a groundbreaking expansion 
of Eighth Amendment rights.69  Under the new “evolving standards of 
decency” test, with the guidance of a United Nations’ survey, the Court 
invalidated the law as violating the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.70 
3. The Height of the Prisoner Rights Movement 
In 1972, the Court decided three cases regarding Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights of prisoners.71  The first case delineated 
                                                 
66 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
67 Id.  Trop concerned a congressional statute, purportedly based on Congress’s war 
powers, which penalized military desertion during a time of war with forfeiture of the 
person’s citizenship.  Id. at 87–89.  The petitioner was indeed a deserter, though he had 
been gone just a day and had turned himself in to an officer.  Id. at 87.  He was court-
martialed and sentenced to three years at hard labor.  Id. at 88.  Upon applying for a 
passport some years later, he was denied on the grounds that he lost citizenship by way of 
being convicted of wartime desertion.  Id. 
68 Id. at 101.  The fundamental problem with the law was that it rendered a person 
stateless, and therefore subject to the laws of wherever he happened to be.  Id.  See Glazer, 
supra note 31, at 1205 (examining the Court’s use of the “evolving standards of decency” 
analysis and its relationship to the issue of proportionality); Gorman, supra note 31, at 467 
(focusing on the Court’s analysis of the “psychological effects of forced denationalization”); 
Robertson, supra note 32, at 1050 (arguing that the Warren Court, with an Aristotelian 
premise, posited that “a person’s communal status can effect his ‘very existence.’” (quoting 
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 11 (1982)). 
69 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.  The court declared that “[t]he [Eighth] Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”  Id.  It is interesting to note that under the Court’s evolving standards of decency 
test, the death penalty was almost off-handedly confirmed as a constitutional punishment 
because it was widely accepted.  Id. 
70 Id. at 101, 103.  The survey revealed that only Turkey and the Philippines punished 
deserters by denationalization.  Id.  As a sub-issue, the Court questioned the statute on the 
grounds that it was purely penal—which the Court defined as having no purpose other 
than punishment—and thus subjected it to heightened scrutiny.  Id. at 96–97.  “Nonpenal” 
laws “impose[ ] a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate 
governmental purpose.”  Id. at 96.  It seems, however, that denationalization could be 
imposed as a non-penal measure to further the government’s legitimate interest in 
maintaining loyal citizens.  See id. 
71 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (punishments for disorderly conduct in the 
prison can lead to valid due process claims); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 
(parole violators are entitled to certain procedural due process rights before parole is 
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the crux of the due process argument for prisoners:  most 
“allegations . . . however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the 
opportunity to offer supporting evidence.”72  Haines v. Kerner went so far 
as to hold that even inmates who hit other inmates with shovels had 
rights.73  Two companion cases regarding parole followed in the same 
year and in both cases the Court not only held that possible parole 
violators are entitled to a hearing pending final revocation, it stated six 
forms of process guaranteed to every individual, explained in the context 
of a parole revocation.74  It was a judicially sound principle that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed these rights to men accused of 
committing a crime, but the extension of these rights to men convicted of 
a crime was also groundbreaking.75  Morrissey v. Brewer was not decided 
                                                                                                             
revoked); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321–23 (1972) (finding that a Buddhist state prisoner’s 
claim that his faith inhibited his chances of eligibility for parole because of discrimination 
within the penal system stated a claim upon which relief could be granted).   See generally 
supra note 38 and accompanying text (quoting the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
application of the Eighth Amendment to the states).   
72 Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21.  Haines was placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary 
measure after striking an inmate on the head with a shovel.  Id. at 520.  While in solitary 
confinement, Haines claimed he suffered injury by having to sleep on the cell floor with 
only blankets to alleviate the pain from a previous injury.  Id.  The Court held his complaint 
stated a claim that required an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 521. 
73 See supra note 72 (detailing the facts of Haines). 
74 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472.  In Morrissey, the Court held that every individual, even a 
convict, is entitled to six rights of Due Process.  Id. at 488–89.  First, the parolee must have 
written notice of the claimed violation.  Id. at 489.  Second, the parolee must have access to 
the evidence against him.  Id.  Third, the parolee must have the opportunity to be heard 
and to present evidence and witnesses in his favor.  Id.  Fourth, the parolee has the right to 
cross-examine the State’s witnesses unless there is good cause to disallow it.  Id.  Fifth, the 
hearing must be neutral and detached, but not necessarily comprised of lawyers or judicial 
officers.  Id.  Finally, the parolee is entitled to a written statement such as an opinion 
relating the evidence the fact-finders relied on in revoking parole.  Id. 
In both cases, the petitioners argued that they were denied a hearing prior to 
revocation of parole.  Id. at 472.  Morrissey was convicted of drawing false checks and was 
paroled.  Id.  He was arrested seven months later for violating the terms of his parole by 
buying a car under an assumed name and making other false statements.  Id. at 473.  After 
spending a week in jail, his parole was revoked.  Id. at 472–73.  Booher, the petitioner in the 
unnamed case, committed similar violations of parole and was similarly held until his 
parole was revoked.  Id. at 473.   
75 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id.  Willens, supra note 46, at 65.  In addition to the courts expanding the power of a 
prisoner, prison officials were also experimenting with granting prisoners more power.  Id.  
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with a thumb on the public pulse of the 1970s, but in an effort to move 
the country forward, perhaps beyond its readiness; the provisions 
allowing such expansive post-conviction rights to prisoners prompted 
some people to warn of the proverbial “slippery slope.”76 
Perhaps as a backlash to the broad notice and hearing rights 
afforded to prisoners, the Court scaled back some due process 
protections in subsequent cases.77  For example, the Court stressed the 
need for a balance between the needs and objectives of the prison 
institution and the general rights guaranteed to prisoners.78  However, in 
step with Trop v. Dulles, the nature of prison disciplinary hearings in the 
future could change due to changed circumstances.79  The “hands off” 
                                                                                                             
For example, at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla, officials gave prisoners 
the power to elect a committee to make recommendations to the administration.  Id.  The 
experiment was at least partially successful; while the prison courtyard had once been a 
restricted security area, it was opened during the experiment, with newly planted grass, 
and prisoners “often walked across the yard carrying briefcases or escorting guests.”  Id. 
76 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488–89, 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warning of the possibility 
or even inevitability that prisoners will end up running the prison).  With the increasing 
popularity of supervised release in the 1970s and its integral part in contemporary criminal 
justice, Justice Douglas, ultimately correct, warned that these enhanced protections for 
incarcerated persons represent an “outworn cliche” and are problematic when presented 
with “present-day realities.”  Id. at 493 n.3 (quoting F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO 
CORRECTIONS:  IMPLICATIONS FOR MANPOWER AND TRAINING 32 (Joint Commission on 
Correctional Manpower and Training 1969)). 
77 See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (the Court takes a more flexible approach 
toward Due Process rights and prison administration). 
78 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).  In Wolff, the Court returned some 
deference to prison administrators that had been previously enjoyed before the initial 
assertion of the Court into such matters.  See id.  The district court found that the Nebraska 
penal and correctional complex employed the following procedural safeguards: 
(1) a preliminary conference with the Chief Corrections Supervisor and 
the charging party, where the prisoner is informed of the misconduct 
charge and engages in preliminary discussion on its merits; (2) the 
preparation of a conduct report and a hearing held before the 
Adjustment Committee, the disciplinary body of the prison, where the 
report is read to the inmate; and (3) the opportunity at the hearing to 
ask questions of the charging party. 
Id. at 558–59.  Accordingly, the Court held that, in the case of a disciplinary proceeding, a 
prisoner is not entitled to retained or appointed counsel.  Id. at 569.  The argument against 
counsel is basically that lawyering begets lawyering and this is contrary to the “predictive 
and discretionary” nature of a hearing.  Id. (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–
88 (1973)).  The focus should be on the rehabilitative purpose of the discipline, and given an 
adversarial climate, the hearing body may be disinclined to tolerate “marginal[ly] deviant 
behavior.”  Id. at 570 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787–88)). 
79 Id.  See also Willens, supra note 46, at 126.  The nature of prison disciplinary 
proceedings did change when the Court held that disciplinary boards did not have to make 
a record of its reasons for denying a prisoner’s request to have witnesses at the hearing.  Id.  
Willens noted that “[t]he right to call favorable witnesses has therefore become 
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doctrine was becoming increasingly popular as the Court gradually 
eroded the due process rights previously extended to prisoners.80  In 
opposition to earlier holdings, the Court refrained from interfering with 
prison administrators and signaled a return to the deferential treatment 
on matters concerning the order and discipline of a prison.81 
4. The Return of Deference 
The conditions of confinement in prisons have been challenged 
often, but such challenges have not recently been adjudged 
constitutional.  In perhaps the most obvious signal that the increase of 
protections afforded prisoners was at an end, Estelle v. Gamble82 
introduced the deliberate indifference standard—the most deferential 
standard since the turn of the twentieth century.83  Essentially, the Eighth 
                                                                                                             
meaningless except in those cases when a prisoner is able to get his case before a judge.”  
Id. at 126–27. 
80 See Montayne v. Haymes 427 U.S. 236 (1976).  In Montayne, prison officials seized a 
document that was signed by eighty-six other inmates that a prisoner was circulating 
claiming he was denied legal assistance by way of removal from the law library.  Id. at 237–
38.  Several days later, Montayne was transferred to a maximum-security prison, but he 
suffered no loss of privileges or good time.  Id. at 238.  Surprisingly, the Court found no 
hearing requirement because a prisoner has no right to remain in a particular facility.  Id. at 
243.  The Court may have been influenced in finding no liberty interest by evidence that the 
prisoner had worked as a law clerk at the library but was relieved because of his constant 
disregard for the rules.  See id. at 238.  See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 240–51 
(1983) (finding that even long distance transfers do not implicate a liberty interest unless 
granted one by state statute); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216–29 (1976) (holding that 
the transfer of a prisoner from a medium to a maximum security prison did not implicate a 
“liberty interest” and thus did not require a hearing to comport with Due Process). 
81 See Montayne, 427 U.S. 236.  In Montayne, the Court found for a second time that there 
was no necessity for a hearing at all before or after a prisoner is transferred to another 
prison facility, as long as the confinement is lawful and within the prisoner’s sentence.  Id. 
at 243.  Cf. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139, 147 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (Marshall views the return of the “hands off” doctrine as a step 
backward caused by a fear of the formation of a union for prison reform and hopes the 
return of the doctrine will be temporary) (quoting Fox, The First Amendment Rights of 
Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972)). 
82 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
83 Id. at 104.  A claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s illness or injury states a 
cause of action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Civil 
Rights Act provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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Amendment is violated when prison officials demonstrate  “deliberate 
indifference” to a prisoner’s serious medical needs resulting in the 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”84 
The “deliberate indifference” standard proved to be a very difficult 
hurdle for prisoners to overcome, and few claims have survived under 
it.85  In a 1994 case regarding workplace conditions, a boar attacked a 
prisoner while working at a prison-run hog farm.86  The prisoner claimed 
                                                 
84 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.  Estelle was injured while working as a prisoner when a bail of 
cotton fell on him.  Id. at 99.  He was subsequently seen on seventeen occasions, prescribed 
various pain medications, and returned to work between each visit, until he refused to 
work and was eventually hospitalized for irregular cardiac rhythms.  Id. at 100–101, 107.  
He alleged in his complaint that the bail of cotton was six hundred pounds and the 
treatment he received after the injury constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 99 n.3.  The Court held that Estelle did not state 
a claim under section 1983 because negligent treatment by his doctor did not constitute 
“deliberate indifference.”  Id. at 104–06.  It is notable that the second requirement of 
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” was borrowed from Gregg v. Georgia.  Id. at 104 
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 18283 (1976) (ending the nationwide moratorium on 
the death penalty)).  See also Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 588–93 (7th Cir. 1996) (removing 
a toenail without anesthetic does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because 
even gross negligence does not equate to deliberate indifference and medical judgments 
should be accorded substantial deference). 
85 See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 98–108.  For an illustration of the difficulty in 
overcoming the “wanton infliction of unnecessary pain” requirement, consider that the 
Court ruled in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber that a mechanical malfunction that 
thwarted the first attempt to electrocute a prisoner, requiring a second electrocution, was 
not unconstitutional because the first attempt was “an innocent misadventure.” Id. at 105 
(citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)).  See also Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1985).  In Whitley, a prisoner who was shot during the quelling 
of a riot did not have an Eighth Amendment claim because the purpose of the shot was a 
good-faith effort to restore discipline to the prison.  Id. at 323–24.  This case has since been 
restricted to emergency situations such as the prison riot at issue.  Id. at 320.  Furthermore, 
the Court noted that a verbal warning before firing would be desirable, even in an 
emergency.  Id. at 324.  Compare id. at 314–28, with Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4–12 
(1992) (O’Connor, J.) (holding that excessive force against an inmate does not necessarily 
have to manifest itself as serious injury to be prohibited).  See also Warren v. Missouri, 995 
F.2d 130, 130−31 (8th Cir. 1993).  Warren stands for the proposition that a prisoner does not 
have an Eighth Amendment claim when he is injured as a result of negligent working 
conditions in a prison workshop.  Id. at 131.  Warren was struck in the wrist by a board that 
“kicked back” from a saw he was operating in a furniture workshop.  Id. at 130.  The Court 
held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because Warren could not 
show deliberate indifference, but at best negligence.  Id. at 130–31. 
86 Lee v. Sikes, 870 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (S.D. Ga. 1994).  Lee pled guilty to three counts of 
burglary and was sentenced to five years at Coastal Correctional Institution in Georgia, but 
was reassigned to Rogers Correctional facility.  Id.  After testing, Lee was assigned to work, 
cleaning and feeding hogs.  Id.  While in a breeding barn, a hog attacked Lee, causing a ten 
to twelve centimeter laceration on his right knee, and other injuries to his shoulders, neck, 
and head.  Id.  Lee claimed he had properly secured the hog in its pen prior to the attack.  
Id.  Although Lee received emergency medical treatment, he alleged that he did not receive 
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that this attack constituted deliberate and wanton indifference because 
he was not provided the proper facilities, training, equipment, or 
medical care; as with most cases, the Court found his complaint 
insufficient to warrant an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.87 
There is no doubt that at points in American history, the treatment of 
prisoners has been inhumane, no matter what the public opinion was at 
the time.88  For example, the conditions in an Arkansas penitentiary were 
so abhorrent, in fact, that the district court called it “a dark and evil 
world completely alien to the free world[ ]” and held that Arkansas’ 
punishment for minor misconduct, relegating prisoners to “punitive 
isolation”, constituted cruel, unusual, and unpredictable punishment. 89 
                                                                                                             
proper “follow up” care, and was still undergoing treatment when he was released on 
parole.  Id. 
87 Id. at 1098.  In an attestation to the changing of times, two cases were deemed to at 
least raise an Eighth Amendment issue that would never have been contemplated by the 
Framers.  Id.  See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828–51 (1994) (holding that a 
transsexual prisoner may have an Eighth Amendment claim if prisoner officials knew of 
the substantial risk of serious bodily harm to the transsexual prisoner and were 
deliberately indifferent); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 28–37 (1993) (holding that 
exposure to second-hand smoke in prisons may constitute deliberate indifference). 
88 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1979).  Hutto is the quintessential example of 
prison conditions gone awry.  Id.  The conditions cannot be described in more vivid terms 
than the Court employs: 
Cummins Farm, the institution at the center of this litigation, required 
its 1,000 inmates to work in the fields 10 hours a day, six days a week, 
using mule-drawn tools and tending crops by hand.  The inmates were 
sometimes required to run to and from the fields, with a guard in an 
automobile or on horseback driving them on.  They worked in all sorts 
of weather, so long as the temperature was above freezing, sometimes 
in unsuitably light clothing or without shoes. 
The inmates slept together in large, 100-man barracks and some 
convicts, known as “creepers,” would slip from their beds to crawl 
along the floor, stalking their sleeping enemies.  In one 18-month 
period, there were 17 stabbings, all but 1 occurring in the barracks.  
Homosexual rape was so common and uncontrolled that some 
potential victims dared not sleep; instead they would leave their beds 
and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards’ station. 
Inmates were lashed with a wooden-handled leather strap five feet 
long and four inches wide.  Although it was not official policy to do so, 
some inmates were apparently whipped for minor offenses until their 
skin was bloody and bruised. 
The ‘Tucker telephone,’ a hand-cranked device, was used to 
administer electrical shocks to various sensitive parts of an inmate’s 
body. 
Id. at 682 nn.3–5 (internal citations omitted). 
89 Id. at 681–82 (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)).  In Holt, 
respondent prison administrators were honest about the conditions of their prison, but 
argued that the conditions were constitutional: 
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However, conditions such as those described above in Hutto v. 
Finney were the exception rather than the norm and, in general, 
prisoners’ complaints of conditions of confinement have not been 
successful.90  Specifically, the Court has held that even restrictive and 
harsh prison conditions are part of the penalty offenders pay for their 
offenses, and the Court will not disturb those conditions absent a 
showing of “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”91  Bluntly 
stated, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.92 
Prison conditions are likely to withstand Eighth Amendment claims 
if the following list of things is not grossly inadequate:  food, air 
ventilation, noise, space, and learning resources.93  Even pretrial 
detainees—that is, people presumed innocent—who are severely 
restricted in confinement have failed in their claims premised on Eighth 
Amendment violations.94  In fact, a prisoner’s desire to live comfortably 
                                                                                                             
Respondents do not contend that they are operating a “good” prison 
or a “modern” prison.  With commendable candor they concede that 
many of the conditions existing at the Penitentiary are bad.  However, 
they deny that they are operating an unconstitutional prison or are 
engaging in unconstitutional practices.  They say that they are doing 
the best they can with extremely limited funds and personnel. 
Holt, 309 F.Supp. at 365. 
90 See, e.g., Warren, 995 F.2d at 131 (describing a prisoner’s serious injuries that did not 
constitute an Eighth Amendment claim).  See supra notes 88–89 (discussing Hutto).  See also 
infra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text (citing examples of cases where prison conditions 
were deemed constitutional). 
91 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).  The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(“SOCF”) was by all accounts of the time a state-of-the-art maximum security facility.  Id. at 
341.  Built in the early 1970s, it contained over 1600 cells, “gymnasiums, workshops, school 
rooms, ‘dayrooms,’ two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barbershop, and library.”  
Id. at 340.  The cells were well-equipped and opened onto dayrooms that were open during 
daytime hours.  Id.  All cell doors would open for ten minutes every hour to allow 
prisoners to move to different locations throughout the prison.  Id.  An increase in Ohio’s 
prison population led to overcrowding in SOCF and administrators decided to “double-
cell[ ]” 1,400 inmates, meaning two inmates shared a cell designed for one person, 75% of 
whom had free movement outside their cells throughout the day.  Id. at 341–42.  Two 
inmates brought suit, claiming that housing two inmates in a single cell constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 339. 
92 Id. at 349. 
93 See id. at 342.  The Court in Rhodes found the facility adequate in all respects, 
regardless of several problems.  Id.  SOCF had seen an increase in violence, though 
proportionate to its rate of growth.  Id. at 343.  Furthermore, although the prison 
population was 38% above capacity, SOCF had not hired more psychiatrists and social 
workers.  Id.  Inmates complained of reduction in work hours because jobs had to be split 
between more people.  Id.  Perhaps most importantly, several studies indicated that each 
inmate in a prison should have fifty to fifty-five square feet of living space, and the cells 
with two inmates fell short of that number.  Id. at 348. 
94 See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243–45 (1983).  In City of Revere, a 
police officer shot and wounded defendant Kivlin.  Id. at 240.  Though the police took 
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and without restriction during confinement does not automatically make 
such restrictions “punishment” at all.95  Essentially, the Court uses 
rational basis scrutiny and will uphold a prison condition if it is 
“reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.”96  Indeed, a 
condition or restriction must be completely arbitrary and purposeless to 
fail rational basis scrutiny.97   Courts have upheld a number of restrictive 
conditions using rational basis scrutiny, including “double celling,”98 
prohibitions on certain paper mail and food packages,99 the regular 
                                                                                                             
Kivlin to the hospital for medical treatment, when the hospital tendered a bill to the city of 
Revere, the police refused to pay it.  Id. at 240–41.  Kivlin, left with a bill for over thirteen 
thousand dollars, sued the city claiming it violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  Id. at 242.  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the police did not violate 
Kivlin’s rights: 
Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its constitutional 
obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital that 
provided the treatment necessary for his injury.  And as long as the 
governmental entity ensures that the medical care needed is in fact 
provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care 
should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care.  
That is a matter of state law. 
Id. at 245.  This Note does not delve into the topic of whether pretrial detainees should 
constitutionally be subject to the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments because they have 
not yet been convicted of a crime. 
95 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).  The facility in Bell was similar to that of 
Rhodes, but it was intended to be a temporary housing condition.  Id. at 524; see Wilson v. 
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).  The Court quoted a Seventh Circuit case in seeming 
frustration at the large amount of insufficient claims: 
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or 
deter.  This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the 
eighteenth century . . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped on [a] 
prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything 
remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult 
the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985. 
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
96 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.  Subject to that test, the conditions are not considered punishment 
at all.  Id. 
97 Id.  The Court, being consistent with other decisions, was careful to point out that the 
decision must be made objectively and cannot be based simply based on how the Court 
thinks a prison should be run.  Id.; see Willens, supra note 46, at 113–15.  The Court’s 
rational basis analysis in Bell v. Wolfish was indicative of the new corporate management 
model becoming popular with the courts and prison administrators.  Id. at 113.  The 
corporate management model treated prisons from the “science of management,” entirely 
disregarding the old notion of prisons as medicine.  Id.  Not only does the model define 
prison as a corporation “whose product is the ‘custody of prisoners[,]’” it rejects the 
previously held idea that prisons have goals at all.  Id. at 115.  Most importantly, the 
corporate management model rejects rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment.  Id. at 114. 
98 See supra note 91 for the definition of “double celling” (“double celling” is the practice 
of housing two inmates in a cell that is designed for one). 
99 See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 523–63 (prohibiting prisoner’s receipt of hardcover books 
not directly from the publisher is not a violation of First Amendment rights); Jones v. N.C. 
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practice of prison “shakedown” inspections, and even body-cavity 
searches of inmates after contact visits.100  Some restrictions on prisoners 
are based on a theory that prisoners have no expectation of privacy at 
all.101  Above all, to succeed in a suit challenging conditions of 
confinement, the prisoner must show that the prison official responsible 
for the prisoner’s well-being acted with a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind when imposing the condition.102  Rather than look to the effect on 
the prisoner in determining whether “wantonness” existed, the analysis 
                                                                                                             
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121–36 (1977) (holding that group activity could 
pose friction in prisons and government must only meet rational basis scrutiny for 
curtailment of First Amendment associational rights as prisons are not public fora); 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 398–422 (1974) (holding that censorship of certain mail 
correspondence poses only incidental restriction on free speech rights and is valid if it 
furthers substantial government interests in security and order). 
100 See generally Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 555.  This case differs from most cases regarding 
prisoner rights because it involves the treatment of detainees not yet convicted of any 
crime.  Id. at 523.  Nevertheless, the Court follows the mandate that prisoners do not have a 
right to live comfortably and the Government has an overriding interest in maintaining 
order and discipline.  Id. at 537, 540. 
101 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 522–23 (1984).  Palmer was reprimanded and had to 
reimburse the state for the cost of a pillowcase he ripped.  Id. at 519-20.  The pillowcase was 
found in a garbage can during a routine “shakedown.”  Id. at 519.  Palmer brought suit, 
claiming that the search violated his right not to be deprived of property without due 
process of law, and that prison official Hudson intentionally destroyed some of Palmer’s 
belongings to harass him.  Id.  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment, as it regards 
searches and seizures, is not applicable to prison cells and therefore prisoners had no 
privacy interest.  Id. at 526.  In fact, random searches are essential in the “constant fight 
against the proliferation of knives and guns, illicit drugs, and other contraband.”  Id. at 528.  
The Court in Hudson justified even harsh conditions of confinement by explaining “what” 
prisoners are: 
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of 
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, 
and often violent, conduct.  Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in 
ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate 
standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have 
shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects 
either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. 
Id. at 526. 
102 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.  Wilson was incarcerated at Hocking Correctional Facility in 
Ohio.  Id. at 296.  His complaint alleged that the conditions of his confinement violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights.  Id.  The Court noted some of his complaints, including 
“overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and 
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining 
facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill inmates.”  Id.  
Wilson sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and $900,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Id.  Building on the objective component of Rhodes, supra notes 86–88, 
the Court required itself to also consider the subjective requirement of scienter on the part 
of the official.  Id. 
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focuses on the constraints facing the official.103  The Court repeatedly 
uses terms such as “serious deprivation” and “malicious cruelty” to 
describe deliberate indifference as conduct wholly apart from mere 
negligence.104 
In the twenty-first century, the Court’s application of the Eighth 
Amendment has centered on death penalty cases, and the Court’s most 
recent application of the Eighth Amendment came in 2008 when it 
invalidated a Louisiana rape statute that authorized the death penalty 
for the rape of a child under twelve years old.105  The Court held that the 
statute violated the Eighth Amendment and contemporary standards of 
decency.106  On the issue of capital punishment, commentators 
                                                 
103 Id. at 303.  Essentially, the Court will view “deliberate indifference” on a sliding scale, 
depending on the circumstances that the official faced.  Id. 
104 Id. at 305.  However, separate conditions not constituting deliberate indifference when 
viewed alone may violate the Eighth Amendment if taken in the aggregate, and this 
aggregation is permitted by petitioners.  Id. at 304.  The principle is severely limited to 
conditions that have a “mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, 
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell 
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.”  Id. 
105 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (holding that imposition of the death 
penalty for raping a child is disproportional and against the country’s consensus); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (the execution of individuals under the age of eighteen when 
they committed a crime violates the Eighth Amendment), abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of 
mentally retarded individuals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).  See also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2008). Section 14:42 governs rape generally, but has additional 
provisions for child rape: 
(2) However, if the victim was under the age of thirteen years, as 
provided by Paragraph A(4) of this Section:(a) And if the district 
attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by 
death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, 
probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the 
determination of the jury. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. at § 14:42(D)(2)(a) (changing the aggravating age from twelve to 
thirteen after the crime was committed but before the decision was issued). 
106 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. at 2646; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.  Kennedy, the 
most recent case addressing proportionality of sentencing, held it to be unconstitutional to 
execute an individual convicted of rape. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.  In Kennedy, a man was 
convicted of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter under section 14:42 of the Louisiana 
Code.  Id. at 2645–46; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.  The petitioner (defendant below) 
violently raped his stepdaughter, resulting in lacerations of her cervix and complete tearing 
of her perineum.  Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2646.  Although the girl originally corroborated the 
step-father’s story that two boys had dragged her into the front lawn and raped her, she 
later admitted that the petitioner raped her in her bed and then drugged her because of the 
profuse bleeding.  Id. at 2647.  The jury convicted him under the statute and unanimously 
recommended the death penalty.  Id. at 2648.  The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the 
decision because “the rape of a child is unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the 
victim and our society.”  Id. at 2648 (citing State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007)). 
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immediately criticized the case for its analysis that no federal law 
authorized the death penalty for rape because the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice had in fact allowed this type of punishment for rape until 
2007.107  On the other hand, the fact that the Court implicitly upheld the 
                                                                                                             
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the imposition of the death penalty for the crime 
of rape is in opposition to contemporary standards of decency and the consensus of the 
nation.  Id. at 2662. The Court applied the “evolving standards of decency” test put forth in 
Trop v. Dulles, and relied on the interpretation of the test in Furman v. Georgia that stated:  
“[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a 
moral judgment.”  Id. at 2649 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
 Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the Court’s decision 
in Coker v. Georgia invalidated capital punishment for all crimes of rape, confining the 
holding Coker to apply to adult rape only.  Id. at 2654–55; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 
(1977).  In Coker, the defendant was serving sentences for murder, rape and other heinous 
crimes when he escaped from prison.  433 U.S. at 587.  He entered Mr. and Mrs. Carver’s 
house through an unlocked door and threatened them with a “board,” while tying up Mr. 
Carver.  Id.  Coker then raped Mrs. Carver, threatening her with a knife he took from the 
kitchen.  Id.  Subsequently, Coker took Mr. Carver’s money and car keys, and fled with 
Mrs. Carver.  Id.  When police apprehended him, they found Mrs. Coker unharmed.  Id.  
The jury, being allowed to consider prior capital felony convictions as aggravating 
circumstances, sentenced Coker to death.  Id. at 590.  Although, the Supreme Court was 
historically charged with the duty of being blind to public opinion in upholding the law, 
the Court in Coker deferred almost completely to public and legislative attitudes, and the 
response of juries in determining the proportionality of a particular sentence.  Id.  This 
decision is not surprising, however, given the acceptance of the test of “evolving standards 
of decency.”  Id.  The Court found that Georgia was the only jurisdiction in the United 
States that authorized a death sentence for rape.  Id. at 595.  Even under outdated laws, 
only sixteen states classified rape as a capital offense, and of the sixteen, only Georgia, 
North Carolina, and Louisiana provided for the death penalty for that offense.  Id. at 594.  
In holding that imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape violated the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court shed light on how it will make an objective determination of the 
proportionality of a sentence to a crime.  Id. at 592. 
Although the Court in Kennedy definitively stated that Coker did not address child rape, it 
undertook a similar analysis by looking at the trends of legislatures and public attitudes 
regarding the death penalty and child rape. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2652.  After finding that 
child rape is a capital offense in only six states, it concluded that “[t]he incongruity 
between the crime of child rape and the harshness of the death penalty poses risks of 
overpunishment and counsels against a constitutional ruling that the death penalty can be 
expanded to include this offense.”  Id. at 2662. 
107 Id. at 2652; 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006) (Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 120).  The 
Court briefly mentioned the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 that expanded the number 
of capital crimes but did not include child rape among the list.  Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 2652.  
However, the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s rape statute is indeed federal law, and is 
conspicuously absent from the Court’s opinion, and the petitioner and respondents’ briefs.  
See generally id. at 2641.  Until 2006, Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
specifically allowed the death penalty for raping a child, meaning that the Court’s 
statement that federal law did not allow the punishment is invalid because at the time the 
defendant was convicted it did.  10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000); National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 109-163, Div. A., Tit. V, § 552(b) (Jan. 6. 2006) (effective Oct. 1, 
2007). 
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alternative punishment under the Louisiana statute—life imprisonment 
at hard labor without possibility of parole—has not been controversial.108 
The history of the Court’s analysis of prisoners’ rights is directly 
correlated with labor in prisons.109  The early days of the Republic 
adhered to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, premised on 
the memories of atrocities committed in England.110  As the nation’s 
population grew, an increase in crimes, and therefore prisoners, led to a 
change in prison administration that ultimately caused the Court to 
protect prisoners in an unprecedented way.111  The pendulum inevitably 
started to swing back by the 1980s, as the Court was bombarded with 
habeas corpus requests, which caused it to again scale back its 
interference with prison administrators.112  As a result, hard labor 
returned to prisons in force in the mid-1990s and spawned a new wave 
of debate about its consequences on prison administration and on the 
Constitution.113 
D. Prisoners, Labor, and the Meaning of Confinement:  1995 to Present 
In 1995, Congress responded to the unmanageable rise in prison 
litigation, foreshadowed by Justice Douglas, by passing the Prison 
Litigation Reformation Act (“PLRA”).114  Perhaps it was the lack of a 
                                                 
108 See generally Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641.  The Court only invalidated that portion of the 
Louisiana statute that provided for imposition of the death penalty—at the state’s request 
and the jury’s decision.  Id.  Their lack of discussion regarding the alternative punishment 
of life imprisonment at hard labor is an implicit affirmation of the constitutionality of the 
penalty.  Id. 
109 See supra Part II (for a history of the Court’s changing analysis of the constitutional 
rights of prisoners). 
110 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (for a brief history of the Bloody Assize of 
1685). 
111 See supra Part II.C.3 (for a discussion of the Court’s increased protection of prisoners). 
112 See supra Part II.C.4 (for a discussion of the Court’s decreasing involvement in prison 
affairs and thus prisoners’ rights).  See also Rod Miller, George E. Sexton & Victor J. 
Jacobson, Making Jails Productive, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, 
D.C.), Oct. 1991, at 1. [hereinafter Miller].  Despite the Court’s official stance, in 1981, then 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered a speech at the University of Nebraska titled, 
“More warehouses or factories with fences?” in which he encouraged correctional 
institutions to teach prisoners job skills instead of just warehousing them.  Miller, supra, at 1 
n.1. 
113 See infra Part II.D (discussing the resurgence of hard labor, including the 
reintroduction of chain gangs in the 1990s). 
114 Prison Litigation Reformation Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. §1997e (2000).  The PLRA was 
actually a second attempt to impose administrative exhaustion requirements.  Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).  Previous legislation enacted in 1980 allowed courts, at their 
discretion, to stay a case while a prisoner exhausted only the plainest of administrative 
remedies.  Id.  Pertinent portions of  section 1997e include: 
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies 
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cohesive public attitude, or the growing number of states contemplating 
and implementing forced labor as a facet of imprisonment that caused 
the Supreme Court to remain largely silent on the issue.115  In the years 
                                                                                                             
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 
 . . . .  
(c) Dismissal 
(1) The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party 
dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is 
satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief. 
(2) In the event that a claim is, on its face, frivolous, malicious, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the 
court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
 . . . .  
(e) Limitation on recovery 
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. 
42 U.S.C. §1997e. 
115 John David Morley, Back on the Chain Gang, TIMES U.K., Aug. 5, 1995, at Features.  On 
May 3, 1995, Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama became the first prison in over 
thirty years to put convicts back on chain gangs.  Id.  Prisoners sentenced to chain gangs are 
mostly repeat offenders or parole violators and have had other privileges stripped, such as 
permission to watch television, have visitors, or make purchases at the prison store.  Id.  See 
Adam Cohen, Dispatches, TIME MAGAZINE, May 15, 1995, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,982949,00.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2008) (describing the sight of men in bright white uniforms, chained together); Miller, supra 
note 112, at 1. 
Between the height of the Depression and 1984, Congress imposed heavy restrictions 
on the interaction of the private sector and prisons regarding labor, relying on interstate 
commerce powers.  Miller, supra note 112, at 1.  However, in 1984 the Justice Assistance Act 
started a pilot program for reinvestigating the use of prison labor in the private sector.  Id.  
See also Bureau of Justice Assistance, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 
PIECP].  The Bureau of Justice Assistance administers a certification program in which 
jurisdictions, on behalf of correctional institutions, apply for the right to interact with the 
private sector.  Id.  Currently, the Bureau has issued forty-one of fifty available certificates.  
Id.; Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories Behind Fences:  Do Prison ‘Real Work’ 
Programs Work?, NIJ JOURNAL NO. 257 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), June 2007, 
at, 32, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/257/real-work-
programs.html.http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000257h.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 
2008).  The re-arrest, conviction, and incarceration rates for PIECP workers are lower than 
“other-than-work” programs.  See Moses, supra, at 1.32. 
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directly following the news that Alabama had reinstituted the chain 
gang, law review journals across the country were rampant with 
Articles, Notes, and Comments on both sides of the debate about the 
constitutionality of hard labor, in particular, chain gangs.116  Since the 
new millennium, however, cries from both sides have subsided, despite 
increasing acceptance of chain gangs and other types of forced labor.117 
For example, Congress retained the Shock Incarceration Program in 
September of 2007, allowing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to place 
inmates in conditions of strict discipline and hard labor for a period not 
to exceed the remainder of their prison term.118  On a smaller scale, 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Lisa Kelly, Chain Gangs, Boogeymen and Other Real Prisons of the Imagination, 5 
RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 1 (1999) (telling a colorful story about the trials and hardships of 
prisoners on a chain gang); Lynn. M. Burley, Note, History Repeats Itself in the Resurrection of 
Prisoner Chain Gangs:  Alabama’s Experience Raises Eighth Amendment Concerns, 15 LAW & 
INEQ. 127 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs pose an unreasonable risk to prisoners and are 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); Stephanie Evans, Note, Making More 
Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521 (2000) (arguing 
that reduced amenities for prisoners would serve to either rehabilitate prisoners or make 
life in prison more undesirable than life outside, thus decreasing recidivism); Glazer, supra 
note 31 (discussing the impact of the no-frills movement on prison management); Gorman, 
supra note 31 (linking the historical use of chain gangs with slavery and concluding that 
modern chain gangs amount to slavery); Sander Jacobowitz, Note, Rattling Chains and 
Smashing Rocks:  Testing the Boudaries [sic] of the Eighth Amendment, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 519 
(1997) (analyzing the constitutionality of chain gangs based on the Supreme Court’s 
previous decisions regarding cruel and unusual punishment); Nancy A. Ozimek, Note, 
Reinstitution of the Chain Gang:  A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
753 (1997) (arguing that the chain gang’s historical roots in the oppression of African-
Americans makes it an unwise and possibly unconstitutional policy); Wendy Imatani 
Peloso, Note, Les Miserables:  Chain Gangs and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1459 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs are per se unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment); Emily S. Sanford, Note, The Propriety and Constitutionality of Chain 
Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (1997) (arguing that chain gangs violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and disgrace notions of human 
dignity). 
117 See Dora Schriro, Correcting Corrections: Missouri’s Parallel Universe, SENTENCING & 
CORRECTIONS (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), May 2008, at 1.  In 1993, Missouri 
implemented its “Buns Out of Bed” initiative, requiring all general population inmates to 
work and to attend school and psychological treatment on a full-time basis, five days a 
week.  Id.  See also Susan Turner & Joan Petersilia, Work Release:  Recidivism and Corrections 
Costs in Washington State, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 
1996, at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163706.pdf (stating that although 
forty-three states have work release programs, fewer than three percent of inmates are 
participants in these programs). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 4046 (2007).  The statute states in its entirety: 
(a)  The Bureau of Prisons may place in a shock incarceration program 
any person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 
12, but not more than 30, months, if such person consents to that 
placement. 
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Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, Arizona (the largest county in 
the country), has frequently made national headlines by being a visible 
and vocal proponent of forced labor; almost a decade ago he became the 
first sheriff to employ female chain gangs.119 
                                                                                                             
(b)  For such initial portion of the term of imprisonment as the Bureau 
of Prisons may determine, not to exceed 6 months, an inmate in the 
shock incarceration program shall be required to— 
(1) adhere to a highly regimented schedule that provides the strict 
discipline, physical  training, hard labor, drill, and ceremony 
characteristic of military basic training; and 
(2) participate in appropriate job training and educational 
programs (including literacy  programs) and drug, alcohol, and 
other counseling programs. 
(c)  An inmate who in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons has successfully completed the required period of shock 
incarceration shall remain in the custody of the Bureau for such period 
(not to exceed the remainder of the prison term otherwise required by 
law to be served by that inmate), and under such conditions, as the 
Bureau deems appropriate. 
Id.; see also Doris Layton MacKenzie, James W. Shaw & Voncile B. Gowdy, An Evaluation of 
Shock Incarceration in Louisiana, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (June 1993) [hereinafter 
MacKenzie] (explaining the goals and implementation of Louisiana’s shock incarceration 
program, and its successes and shortcomings). 
119 CNN.com, Arizona Criminals find jail too In-‘Tents’, July 27, 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/27/tough.sheriff/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).  “Sheriff 
Joe,” as he is commonly called, is known for making prisoners wear pink jumpsuits, eat 
cold meals, and stay in tents in the sweltering heat of summer, all in the name of 
punishment.  Id.  He even tried to take away prisoners’ rights to cable but was thwarted by 
a federal statute guaranteeing that right and instead opted to allow prisoners to watch only 
such channels as The Weather Channel.  Id.; see Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of 
Maricopa County, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 19, 2007) (detailing some of the programs he has 
instituted, the methods of punishment, and their purpose).  When asked about 
rehabilitation, Sheriff Arpaio stated: 
I believe, ah, I believe that those convicted like they are right now, 
including Mike Tyson, uh, that that’s why he’s in pink underwear and 
striped uniforms and two meals a day at fifteen cents a meal, fifteen to 
eighteen cents, ah, that they should be punished.  I use the word 
punishment, but we do have rehabilitation, we do have education, we 
have the only high school under a sheriff, we have a jail for juveniles, 
we have a drug prevention [inaudible] I could go on and on, religion, 
everything. So when they call me the meanest, toughest, sheriff in the 
universe they never talk about our rehabilitation [inaudible].  Still you 
should never live better in jail than you do on the outside and that’s 
why they eat the slop—it’s not slop, it’s alright, it’s got 2500 calories—
that’s why they do that.  That’s why they don’t have the, ah, the 
movies, took those away, that’s why all the tv goes except the weather 
channel, and the coffee and the salt and the ketchup, and the pink 
underwear and the chain gangs and the hot tents, 148 degrees in the 
summertime. I could go on and on and on and on with the theory is 
you should not like it because maybe they’ll hate it so much they won’t 
come back. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/11
2009] An Integrated Model of Prison Labor 1453 
A landmark event occurred in 2007 when the number of prison 
inmates exceeded three million.120  In an increasing effort to recoup the 
costs of housing these inmates, or at least exact retribution on them, most 
states have instituted some form of labor program, and a growing 
number of states have included hard labor as a component of their 
programs.121  Furthermore, some states are experimenting with new 
models of prison labor programs, drawing on historical models.122 The 
                                                                                                             
Interview with Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County, in Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 19, 2007) 
(Mike Tyson was in the Maricopa County Jail at the time of the interview). 
120 See Behind Bars (Discovery Channel television broadcast Oct. 8, 2007). 
121 See American Chain Gang (Cinema Libre Distribution 2005) (documentary) (cataloguing 
labor policies in several states); supra note 49 and accompanying text (detailing the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of peonage as a valid labor model); infra Part II.E (describing 
the contract model and its uses throughout history).  Because the Supreme Court defined 
peonage as slavery, forced labor in prisons took the form of one of several variations on the 
contract model.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infra Part II.E.  First, the piece-
price model is very similar to the contract model, except that the government retains more 
control over the production process.  See infra Part II.E.  See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 
160.  Whereas in the contract system, the contractor pays the government a sum for the use 
of labor and the resulting product, in the piece-price system, the contractor does not pay for 
the labor, but pays one fee per unit of output.  Id.  The private party contractor may still 
send quality inspectors to the prison to ensure a good product, but the government warden 
is the foreman of production.  Id.  Second, under a public-account system, all private 
control is removed from the manufacturing process.  Id. at 161.  The prison administrator 
essentially becomes the entrepreneur; he is responsible for commercial process all the way 
from choosing what product to manufacture to choosing how to effectively market the 
finished product.  Id.  A successful public-account system requires a prison administrator 
who is also very business-savvy to function properly.  Id.  Third, the state-use model is a 
uniquely innovative system wherein the entire market is self-contained within the prison.  
Id. at 163.  The prison is the gatherer, producer, laborer and consumer of goods.  Id.  The 
most important aspect of the state-use model is its near removal of prison labor from 
competition with the free labor market.  Id.  Finally, the public-works-and-ways model is a 
special form of the state-use model in that it only uses prison labor to improve “the durable 
possessions of the state.”  Id. at 167.  Thus, projects such as cutting brush along highways 
are not contracted out or performed by a special department of state employees but are 
instead performed by prisoners.  Id.; infra Part II.E.  The public-works-and-ways model is 
growing in popularity among states today.  See infra Part II.E. 
122 Sexton, supra note 48, at 3.  Three examples of states that are experimenting with 
hybrid programs suggest that a widely implemented set of programs nationwide could 
solve Twenty-First century prison problems.  Id.  First, in Arizona, Best Western 
International hired women from Arizona’s correctional institution to take reservations for 
Best Western Hotels.  Id.  With Best Western’s headquarters nearby, the use of prisoners 
who were willing to work weekends and holidays was a positive solution for the prison, 
the prisoners, and Best Western.  Id.  Second, Wahlers Company and Arizona Correction 
Industries (“ARCOR”) started a joint venture in a furniture plant.  Id.  ARCOR built the 
plant and supplied prisoners to work in it, while Wahlers supplied the equipment, and 
both entities share in the profits.  Id.  The office furniture the plant produces is sold in the 
open market and is also used by the state.  Id.  Third, a Minnesota state prison contracts 
with Control Data Corporation (“CDC”) for the assembly of disk drives and other 
computer products.  Id.  Prison employees supervise production and prisoner labor for the 
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history of prisoners’ rights in America reveals vacillations between a 
conservative ideology of punishment, epitomized by the phrase getting 
“tough on crime,” and a liberal ideology of reformation and 
rehabilitation.123  Both ideologies have the goal of reducing crime and in 
particular, recidivism, and although they seek to counter idleness in 
different ways, both ideologies hold that idleness in a prisoner is an 
unacceptable trait.124  Historically, neither ideology has been 
successful.125  The shift in ideological tides can be seen in the overarching 
category of prison conditions generally, and it is also evidenced through 
the prevalence and style of the subcategory of labor systems in 
prisons.126 
E. Six Existing Models of Prison Labor 
The foregoing history aids a scholar in understanding the picture of 
prison administration in order to study the comparatively small area of 
prison labor because the judicial standards as applied to other areas of 
prison administration are translated into prison labor policies.127  Of six 
historical models, the lease system most closely parallels the free market 
                                                                                                             
benefit of the prison and CDC, their sole customer.  Id.  To increase productivity and thus 
profit, CDC provided the plant layout, training, and continuing technical assistance to the 
prison.  Id. 
123 CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 45, at 89.  Cullen and Gilbert credit Conservatives with 
making rehabilitation a goal of prisons a “hard sell[,]” but do not completely absolve 
Liberals either: 
Conservatives have frequently been suspicious of efforts aimed at 
regenerating offenders, fearing that they will furnish an excuse to 
release the wicked back into society where they once again will prey 
on the defenseless.  Though objections have been raised less often by 
more liberal elements, disenchantment with the prospect of molding a 
criminal justice system around the rehabilitative ideal has long 
sprinkled the writings and speeches of those on the left. 
Id.  See Sanford, supra note 116, at 1170 (noting that politicians hope to deter criminals by 
giving the appearance of authoritative discipline). 
124 See, e.g., supra note 46.  See also Robertson, supra note 32, at 1011.  The Auburn and 
Philadelphia prison models sought to battle idleness by making prisoners work.  Id.  The 
Philadelphia model stressed silent and solitary work, while the Auburn model stressed 
silent and collective work.  Id. at 1011 n.30. 
125 See discussion supra Part II (discussing the apparent failure of historical prison labor 
models); see also, e.g., supra note 46, infra note 137.  The Auburn and Philadelphia 
authoritarian models failed, however; Philadelphia’s silent system drove inmates insane, 
and the violent supervision under the Auburn system discredited any notions of prisoner 
reform.  See supra note 46, infra note 137. 
126 See infra Parts II.D-E (for a discussion of different historical prison labor models and 
several contemporary experiments). 
127 See infra Part III for an analysis of the constitutionality of prison labor models using 
Eighth Amendment standards from other areas of prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. 
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because it is essentially a contract between two parties for an exchange of 
goods.128  When viewed as an exchange of chattels, it is easy to 
understand why the Supreme Court intimated that the system amounted 
to the reintroduction of slavery.129  
The conservative ideology of punishment through hard labor 
dominates the lease system.130  Under the lease system, the government 
lends its convicts to private parties for a fee, and the private parties 
control every aspect of the convicts’ lives.131  Historically, however, this 
labor model produced infinitely more criminal deviance than it cured.132  
When viewed as a crude metaphor, a dog that is constantly kicked by its 
master becomes hardened and unpredictable, and will eventually lash 
out with vengeance and blood-thirst.  In sum, a prisoner that is treated 
like an animal will eventually become violent toward the society that 
                                                 
128 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156 (defining the lease system); see also FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 51 (describing the lease system). 
129 See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914) (holding that systems of surety 
are equivalent to private peonage and violate the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (holding that the state may impose involuntary servitude 
as a punishment for a crime, but may not punish one as a criminal if he breaks a contract to 
work for another private party); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 215 (1905) (returning a 
person to a condition of servitude unlawfully and knowingly justifies a sentence of four 
years at hard labor).  See also Gorman, supra note 31, at 452–58 and Ozimek, supra note 116, 
at 758–64 (suggesting that increasing conviction of African Americans is fueled by a desire 
to “re-enslave them”). 
130 ROTHMAN, supra note 34, at 103.  Conservative criminologists believed that idleness 
was closely linked to criminal deviance.  Id.  As Rothman states, “[p]roponents of a 
penitentiary training believed that the tougher the course, the more favorable the results.”  
Id.  See Robertson, supra note 32, at 1012 (explaining the popular belief that criminality was 
a familial defect and social contagion). 
131 CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 181.  Christianson describes the system as follows:  
“[t]he state abdicated responsibility for the prisoners’ welfare, leaving it to private 
contractors whose primary or exclusive objective was making a profit.”  Id.  See Garvey, 
supra note 46, at 356.  While the contract system dominated the North, the lease system was 
favored in the booming post-Civil War economy.   Id. at 355.  Although the system was not 
formally one of slavery, lessees were overwhelmingly black men performing work that 
white freemen were unwilling to do.  Id. at 356; Sanford, supra note 116, at 1157.  In 
addition to government leasing, a related practice of criminal surety emerged.  Sanford, 
supra note 116, at 1157.  Under the criminal surety system, private citizens would pay the 
fines of convicts in return for their labor.  Id.  If the convict refused to labor to the 
satisfaction of the citizen, however, he could be returned to imprisonment.  Id.  See also 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 150 (holding that systems of surety are unconstitutional). 
132 See Schriro, supra note 117, at 1 (for a discussion of recidivism and prison brutality); 
Turner, supra note 117, at 1 (PIECP members have lower recidivism rates than other 
prisoners); Garvey, supra note 46, at 357.  Convicts’ living and working conditions were so 
abhorrent, in fact, that at its worst, convict mortality rates reached 40%, annually.  Garvey, 
supra note 46, at 357. 
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imprisoned him.133  Because of the lease system’s failure to reform, the 
number of prison brutality incidents at the hands of lessees, and the 
system’s disruption of competition in the truly free labor market, the use 
of the lease system largely ended by 1921 with only three states retaining 
the system in its pure form at that time.134 
Although the lease system fell out of fashion, the contract system 
remained popular into the early 1900s.135  Typically, the government 
supplied the facilities and machines for the product, while the contractor 
was only responsible for the raw materials.136  Many prisons that 
employed the contract model did so in an effort to reduce costs through 
privatization.137  The model’s success was ultimately its demise, where it 
                                                 
133 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157.  This Note does not suggest that prisoners are 
animals; however, any living creature that is kept in a cage long enough may exhibit the 
qualities of an abused animal.  Id.; Robertson, supra note 32, at 1020 (“[T]he danger of 
assault by predatory inmates represents an ongoing challenge to one’s manhood because 
the inmate society equates ‘toughness’ with masculinity.”); Willens, supra note 46, at 137 
(arguing that the current system advocates a “them and us” mentality, and that society 
would benefit if that mentality was changed to one that saw prisoners as our family 
members). 
134 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157; Garvey, supra note 46, at 363.  George W. Cable 
published The Silent South in 1885 that shocked the nation with its story of a man who 
lasted only two months under the system.  Garvey, supra note 46, at 363.  The man was 
convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to ninety days in country jail, but was soon leased to 
a lumber company where he was assigned to strip turpentine from the swamps.  Id.  When 
he could not keep up with the fifteen-hour workdays, he was beaten to death.  Id. at 364.  
See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 155–77.  Tales of similar brutality ended the system in 
most states; only Alabama, Florida, and North Carolina still used the prison lease model in 
1921.  ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157.  North Carolina was the last state to abolish the lease 
system, and did not do so until 1933.  Id.; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187; Garvey, 
supra note 46, at 364.  The system took the longest to die out in the South, as even in 1885, 
two-thirds of prisoners were still leased out.  CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. 
135 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45; supra note 48 and accompanying text (defining 
the contract system).  See also CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.  For example, an 1885 
survey showed that New England had 17% of prisoners working in a contract system, the 
Middle Atlantic had 41% in a contract system, the South had 15%, and the West had 42% of 
its prisoners engaged in contract labor.  Id.  See also Garvey, supra note 46, at 358–59.  The 
fall of the contract model was due mainly to opposition from organized free labor.  Id.  The 
early argument opposing convict labor was that it degraded the “dignity of free labor.”  Id. 
at 359.  After a short time, however, the more honest argument against prison labor was 
that it was an economic threat to the free labor market.  Id. 
136 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158.  This is a large shift from the lease system, in that 
in the contract system the government houses, feeds, clothes, and protects the prisoners.  
Id. 
137 Garvey, supra note 46, at 352.  As a response to the failure of public-account systems 
used in Cherry Hill and Auburn prisons, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and 
Indiana—to name a few—started a contract system of labor.  Id.  By 1867, the contract 
model was the dominant labor model, and goals of profit slowly overtook goals of reform.  
Id. 
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competed so effectively with free labor manufacturers that they 
successfully lobbied for its extinction.138 
The piece-price model and the public-account model would be 
plotted next along the continuum of increased government control over 
prison labor.139  Under the piece-price model, private contractors 
supplied the prison with the materials to make a certain product; the 
prisoners then manufactured the product under the direction of 
administrators; and the private contractor purchased the final product 
for sale on the open market.140  The system is aptly named because, 
whereas in the lease system the private party pays a price per person, in 
the piece-price system the private party pays a price per piece.141  The 
public-account system is similar to the piece-price system in that private 
parties purchased a finished product manufactured within the prison.142  
However, the public-account system removes all private interests from 
the manufacturing process—the only role of the private party is as 
purchaser or consumer, and the private party does not supply the prison 
with the materials to make the products it purchases.143  There are few 
specific historical examples of these systems because their conception 
coincided with the Great Depression, which led the government to 
abolish all prison labor that competed with free labor.144 
                                                 
138 Garvey, supra note 46, at 352.  The breaking point for the contract model came with the 
nationwide depression in the 1890s, when laws restricted the sale of prison-made goods to 
the state.  Id. at 362. 
139 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159–60 (defining the piece-price model and the public-
account model). 
140 Garvey, supra note 46, at 349.  Philadelphia’s “Walnut Street Jail,” opened in 1790 and 
in reality an early penitentiary, utilized this model.  Id.  By the early 1800s, however, the 
system was falling out of favor because prison overcrowding led to an inefficient 
production system and the production system never yielded a profit.  Id. 
141 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160.  The piece-price system has not been widely utilized.  
Id.; see CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.  In 1885, not more than 8% of prisoners worked 
in a piece-price system in any region nationwide.  CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187. 
142 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187 (providing a brief 
description of the public-account system). 
143 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160; CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.  Essentially, the 
public-account (or state-account, as it is also called) system calls for the state to go into 
business for itself, selling the products it makes on the open market.  CHRISTIANSON, supra 
note 47, at 187. 
144 Garvey, supra note 46, at 366–67.  In response to the Great Depression, the government 
enacted the Hawes-Cooper Act and the Ashurst-Sumners Act.  Id.  The Hawes-Cooper Act 
allowed states to prohibit other states’ prison-made goods from entering their state and 
thus flooding their market.  Id.  Several years later, the Ashurst-Sumners Act made 
transporting prison goods interstate a federal crime regardless of state law.  Id.; see 
CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 187.  Prior to the Great Depression however, states utilized 
the system to produce such products as whips and saddlery hardware.  CHRISTIANSON, 
supra note 47, at 187.  For example, in 1885, 22% of prisoners in New England worked in a 
public-account system, as compared with 21% in the Middle Atlantic, 18% in the West, and 
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Prison institutions responded to harsh restrictions on free market 
sales by almost universally adopting the state-use model.145  The state-
use model creates a closed market in that prisons manufacture, market, 
and sell their products exclusively to the state in which they are 
located.146  Although hopes for the system were high, it was deemed a 
failure for several reasons and largely resulted in prisoner idleness—the 
very condition labor programs sought to avoid.147  Despite heavy 
criticism, state-use systems are still popular in some states today.148  
                                                                                                             
just 2% in the South.  Id.; see MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 220.  Perhaps as a result of the 
system’s moderate success, the United States Industrial Commission in 1900 and the United 
States Commissioner of Labor on prison industry in 1905 “frown[ed]” on the practice and 
favored the closed market state-use system instead.  MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 220. 
145 Garvey, supra note 46, at 367.  Whereas immediately before the Hawes-Cooper Act 
16% of prisoners worked under a contract system, 42% under state-use systems, and 23% 
under public works systems, by 1940, “almost all prisoners worked for the state.”  Id. 
146 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 162–63.  In general, state divisions must buy from the 
prison if it can fill the request.  Id. at 162.  See Garvey, supra note 46, at 364–65; Ozimek, 
supra note 116, at 756–57.  In the state-use system, “the state represents the demand side of 
the market[,]” and “[o]n the supply side, each individual inmate acts as a firm . . . .”  
Ozimek, supra note 116, at 756.  Ozimek contended that the system is inefficient because an 
inmate will only exert effort if the benefit derived is greater than the cost.  Id. at 757; 
Garvey, supra note 46, at 365.  The system manifested itself differently in the North than in 
the South.  Garvey, supra note 46, at 356.  In the North, prisoners worked within the prison 
manufacturing goods in prison shops.  Id.  In contrast, Southern prisoners worked on 
prison farms and chain gangs.  Id. 
147 Garvey, supra note 46, at 368.  After the Hawes-Cooper Act and the Ashurst-Sumners 
Act were enacted, only 23% of state prisoners were working.  Id.  One reason for the 
system’s failure is that prison officials were not trained for and did not desire to undertake 
the business management aspect of their new positions.  Id.  Furthermore, although state 
agencies were bound by contract to purchase prison goods first, they often did not until 
they were forced.  Id.; see ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 164.  Robinson asserts that the state-
use system would be most effective where prisoners were employed in “growing 
vegetables or in making clothing for themselves or in repairing or constructing buildings 
forming a part of the institution in which they are confined.”  ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 
164.  Robinson’s suggestion for the state-use system is essentially the application of the 
public-works-and-ways model, a subset of the state-use model.  Id. at 168. 
148 Garvey, supra note 46, at 371.  See Indiana Department of Correction News, Offenders 
and Staff at Westville Correctional Facility Build New Wooden Conference Table for Governor’s 
Office, 
http://www.in.gov/indcorrection/news/07172007NewGovernorTable.htmlhttp://www.i
n.gov/indoc/news/07172007NewGovernorTable.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) 
[hereinafter INDOC].  For example, Indiana employed this model in producing a table for 
the Governor’s Office in 2007.  Id.  An Indiana prison had a wood-working class for 
qualifying inmates, and the governor’s office commissioned the class to create a new table 
for the entryway to the office.  Id.  All of the men in the class contributed to the project 
under the watchful eye of the prison instructor, and the result was stunning to both the 
governor and the public.  Id.  With $300 for raw materials and free labor, the prison 
produced a solid wood table, inlaid with the insignia of the state.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
counties of the state were hand-placed on the table using only species of trees that are 
found in Indiana.  Id. 
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The final model, the public-works-and-ways model, is really a branch of 
the state-use system.149  Under this system, prisoners labor for the benefit 
of the state only on public projects, primarily by building roads.150  This 
system has been used mainly in the South, and though it was disfavored 
during the Great Depression, it has regained popularity in the last 
twenty years.151 
Comprehending the evolution of prisoners’ rights and the use of 
forced labor in prisons requires contemplating the history of the 
Republic, the Constitution, public opinion, and judicial opinion.152  It is 
in this context that this Note will discuss the constitutionality, wisdom, 
and appropriateness of prison labor in the twenty-first century.153 
III.  ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS AS APPLIED TO PRISON LABOR AND 
THE WISDOM OF TRADITIONAL LABOR MODELS 
Society has gone to extreme lengths to mystify prison, as if to empower the 
institution by obscuring its inner workings.154 
 
The history of prisoners’ rights includes the use of prisoners for 
labor.  Six models of prison labor have traded places as the most popular 
                                                 
149 ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 168.  The public-works-and-ways model focuses prison 
labor on public projects such as building or repairing roads, “draining swamps,” or 
“reforesting devastated areas.”  Id. at 169. 
150 Id. at 167.  Robinson stated that prisoners are working under this model if “prisoners 
are employed mainly in erecting public buildings or in constructing highways or in similar 
work where the purpose is to add to the durable possessions of the state[.]”  Id.  See 
Ozimek, supra note 116, at 758.  Ozimek maintained that public-works-and-ways models, 
such as the use of chain gangs, are economically inefficient because prisoners do not have 
the “proper” incentives to work.  Id. 
151 Garvey, supra note 46, at 365.  In the South, Georgia began using the chain gang in 
1908 to build much-needed roads on which automobiles increasingly traveled.  Id.  Georgia 
coined the project the “good roads movement.”  Id.  See Ozimek, supra note 116, at 1158.  
Judges began sentencing convicts to chain gangs in the 1860s in response to prison 
overcrowding.  Id.  During the Great Depression, however, the federal government banned 
prisoner labor in this form in favor of hiring unemployed free laborers.  Id.; Garvey, supra 
note 46, at 365.  By the 1940s, chain gangs were no longer used.  Garvey, supra note 46, at 
366.  But see Morley, supra note 115, at Features.  In 1995, however, Alabama became the 
first state to reinstate the chain gang.  Id. 
152 See supra Part II for a history of prisoners’ rights in America. 
153 See infra Part III (providing an analysis of traditional prison models and their 
constitutionality). 
154 CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 307.  Christianson explains his statement by 
continuing, “This mystification serves to absolve society of responsibility, while conferring 
legitimacy and morality on the prison itself.  An aura of secrecy lends mystery and 
idealization.  For, indeed, few human inventions have become so charged with symbolic 
meaning as the modern prison.”  Id. 
Riederer: Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment Through an Integra
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1460 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
throughout the past three centuries.155  The Supreme Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of five of the models, and the models’ 
use, or non-use, was historically connected more to complications with 
the free market than with the Court.156  Each system has a differing 
relationship to free labor and a different level of administration.157  
Furthermore, each system offers the state and the prisoner different 
monetary and non-monetary incentives.158  Part II of this Note 
illuminated the big picture of administration and the jurisprudence 
surrounding it and introduced traditional prison models.159  Part III of 
this Note will discuss the benefits and detriments of the different prison 
labor models introduced in Part II, and will apply the judicial standards 
outlined in Part II to identify possible constitutional problems.160  Part III 
of this Note will discuss each model in turn.161 
First, the lease system has very positive effects for the government, 
but likewise has negative effects on prisoners.162  Administration of 
prisoners under the lease system is simple and cost effective for the 
government because the government’s sole responsibility is to establish a 
way for the lessee to choose and take possession of the prisoner.163  As a 
result of the system’s cost effectiveness, the sum of money the 
government receives is “profit.”164 
                                                 
155 See supra Part II.E (outlining six traditional models of prison labor); infra Part III 
(examining the models’ strengths and weaknesses). 
156 See supra notes 144–47 (describing the struggle between free labor and forced labor 
because of forced labor’s ability to produce the same goods at a cheaper price, and also 
discussing the government’s response to this dilemma). 
157 See supra Part II.E (explaining that models range from being completely closed to the 
free market to being completely integrated with it). 
158 See infra Part III (stating that some models offer profit to the prison, while other 
models are solely for the benefit of the prisoner). 
159 See discussion supra Part II. 
160 See infra Part III (hypothesizing that the lease system is the only system of the six with 
a serious potential for unconstitutionality). 
161 See supra Part II.E (the traditional models discussed are the lease system, the contract 
system, the piece-price system, the public-account system, the state-use system, and the 
public-works-and-ways system). 
162 See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text (noting that positive aspects include a 
high profit margin for the government while negative aspects include high rates of abuse 
toward prisoners and probable unconstitutionality). 
163 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (indicating that under the lease model, 
private contractors pay a sum to gain possession of prisoners for their private interests).  
See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 156.  Robinson stresses that the lessee clothes, feeds, 
houses, and protects prisoners.  Id. 
164 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157.  Robinson reports that in 1912, Alabama grossed 
$1,073,286.16 in earnings from its use of the lease system.  Id.  See also CHRISTIANSON, supra 
note 47, at 187.  As the system gained opposition, the original argument in favor of its 
abolition was that it destroyed the dignity of labor; however, the more convincing 
argument was that the system was so profitable that it seriously threatened free labor.  Id. 
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From the prisoner’s perspective, his very life is at the mercy of the 
lessee.165  Economically, the lessee desires to produce the greatest 
product for his money, and that motive encourages him to provide only 
minimum necessities to the prisoner while working the prisoner as hard 
as he can without causing death.166  Furthermore, the government has no 
incentive to police the use of its prisoners, as prisoners are abundant and 
easily replaceable.167 
The lease model raises the most obvious constitutional problems.168  
If it were reinstituted today in the same form as it was traditionally 
administered, it would almost certainly be invalidated as violating the 
Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments.169  Applying the concept of 
evolving standards of decency, it is difficult to argue that under 
contemporary standards of decency and humanity this treatment would 
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment because of its strong 
association with slavery.170  Furthermore, under the deliberate 
indifference standard, courts could find that the wardens who turn their 
head to the brutal treatment of prisoners are indirectly inflicting 
unnecessary and wanton pain.171  Certainly courts could find the lease 
model to be a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Thirteenth 
                                                 
165 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (noting that at one time it was a crime 
to break a lease, punishable by large fines and continuing imprisonment at hard labor); see 
also note 134 and accompanying text (noting that in 1885, The Silent South was published, 
recounting true stories of prisoner brutality that lead to death). 
166 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 357.  In fact, death was common under the system 
because prisoners were easily replaceable.  Id.  At the height of the model’s use, convict 
mortality rates reached 40% in some prisons.  Id. See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157 
(explaining that “[s]ince every unnecessary cent spent by the lessee on the prisoners would 
reduce his profits by that amount, one would naturally expect to find the minimum of 
existence supplied to the prisoners and the maximum of effort demanded from them”). 
167 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 157.  In 1912, the brutality of the lease system was so 
apparent that the governor of Arkansas pardoned 360 convicts and ended the use of the 
lease system in the state.  Id. 
168 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (recounting the Supreme Court’s 
condemnation of “peonage” as a form of slavery and thus repugnant to the Eighth and 
Thirteenth Amendments, while reaffirming that convicted criminals can be subjected to 
other forms of involuntary servitude as a condition of their confinement). 
169 See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (noting that it is unconstitutional to 
knowingly and forcibly return people to a condition of servitude); supra note 50 
(contrasting the holdings in Reynolds, which held that systems of surety are 
unconstitutional, and Bailey, which held that the violation of any contract requiring labor to 
repay debt could not be a criminal offense). 
170 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (setting forth the requirement for 
punishment to meet “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society[,]” the new test set forth by the Court ); supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing the deliberate indifference standard and the 
requirement that prisoners demonstrate that prison officials engaged in the wanton 
infliction of pain to prevail on a challenge to prison conditions). 
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Amendment, and in fact, the Supreme Court has held that it does.172  In 
short, under this system, the government simply replaces the slave-
trader of old by selling humans to be used for involuntary servitude to a 
private master.173 
Second, the contract model draws on the positive aspects of the lease 
model in that it allows private entities to obtain cheap labor and 
maximum product.174  It also seeks to remedy the cruelty that prisoners 
experienced under the lease model.175  This system is not without its 
faults, however.176  For example, the contract system and the lease 
system share the same incompatibility with the free labor market and are 
opposed equally by interested parties.177  Furthermore, while each party 
is performing the proper function—the government maintains the 
prisoners and the contractor maintains the business—each party is 
fundamentally at odds with the other.178  Ultimately, the government 
profits less because it must pay to house the prisoners, and the contractor 
profits less because he must pay more for the prisoner’s labor.179 
                                                 
172 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting that the practice of hiring out 
convicts subjects them to involuntary servitude); see also Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215 (holding that 
a person cannot forcibly detain another person for the purpose of satisfying a debt); supra 
note 129 (indicating that some scholars even argue that increased conviction of African 
Americans is in reality an attempt to re-enslave them). 
173 See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146–47 (1914) (condemning a system of 
posting surety bonds for a person in return for that person’s servitude).  The court 
described the agreement as “an everturning [sic] wheel of servitude” because of the 
worker’s constant fear of re-imprisonment.  Id. 
174 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45 (explaining that the contract system is similar to 
the lease system except that, under the contract system, the prison retains the responsibility 
to feed, clothe, and protect the prisoners).  See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159.  
Robinson believes there is more potential in the contract model than the lease system 
because the contract model results in better treatment of prisoners and is therefore a milder 
form of punishment.  Id. 
175 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 362 (noting that by 1867, the contract model was the 
dominant labor model); supra note 134 (recounting a story of the brutal death of a prisoner 
for not being able to work fast enough). 
176 See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 93 (discussing the complex forces in play forming the 
anti-contract movement). 
177 See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 94 (giving an example of the opposition of free labor 
to prison labor); see also Garvey, supra note 46, at 366–67 (the Hawes-Cooper Act and the 
Ashurst-Sumners Act, passed during the Great Depression, made it a federal crime to 
transport prison-made goods interstate); supra note 145 (describing the shift from the 
contract model to the public-account model in response to the Hawes-Cooper Act and the 
Ashurst-Sumners Act). 
178 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 158.  Robinson makes much of the contract system’s 
advantages, the most important of which being that “it does not require business ability on 
the part of the prison officials nor humanitarian impulses on the part of the contractor.”  Id. 
179 See id. at 159 (however menial the amount of money lost on each prisoner by each 
side, the loss of profit can be significant in the aggregate). 
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From the prisoner’s perspective, his life is more bearable because in 
place of punishment are characteristics that approach, but fall short of, 
reformation.180  For example, the prisoner is not idle during the day as he 
would be in a warehouse prison, and the prisoner learns the discipline 
and self-worth of a workingman without experiencing the unpredictable 
anger of a brutalized animal.181  However, an improvement in living 
conditions does not equate with adequate living conditions, as accounts 
of dangerous and unsanitary conditions exist under the contract model 
as well.182  Because the model satisfies neither the penological goal of 
reformation nor a prisoners’ desire to live in safe conditions, the model is 
undesirable.183 
Third, the invention of the piece-price model is another 
improvement in preserving the humanity of prisoners but is also another 
step away from the efficiency and profitability of the old lease system.184  
A positive aspect is that wardens, if they choose, can show a great 
amount of care for prisoners, as they serve as both boss and caretaker.185  
However, administration takes on a new level of complexity, and 
                                                 
180 See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 179.  Elmira Reformatory implemented some of 
the most groundbreaking reform measures, such as indeterminate sentencing, designed to 
increase a prisoner’s motivation to behave correctly.  Id.; see also Garvey, supra note 46 
(describing the harsh treatment that is avoided through the contract system); supra note 47 
(explaining the progressive grading system that was becoming popular in prisons as a 
motivational tool). 
181 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 350 (using Pennsylvania’s “‘silent’[ ] system” to explain 
prevailing notions of criminality and dismissing the treatment as unconstitutional); supra 
notes 46, 124 (noting that Pennsylvania’s famous warehouse prisons required prisoners to 
remain in constant, silent solitude, which eventually and unexpectedly drove them insane). 
182 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 159 (explaining that one reason for poor conditions 
was that the prison population was booming despite a steady decline in prison labor); see 
also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159 (arguing that a prisoner under the care of a warden is 
better cared for, “although one must not infer that he is thereby adequately cared for[.]”). 
183 See supra notes 177–82 (analyzing some of the shortcomings of the contract model). 
184 See supra note 121 (under the piece-price system, a buyer pays a flat price per unit of 
output); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (same); infra notes 185–90 and 
accompanying text (outlining positive aspects of the system, such as prison officials’ 
opportunity to rehabilitate prisoners, and negative aspects, such as the ever-present friction 
of the model with free labor). 
185 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 159.  Robinson also notes an advantage of the system—
the likelihood of reduced problems between contractor and government because opposing 
interests are more separated.  Id. 
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therefore costliness.186  In addition, the stress on free market competition 
with businesses that do not employ prison labor still exists.187 
The piece-price system fails to satisfy either the liberal ideal of 
reformation or the conservative ideal of punishment.188  From a liberal 
perspective, reformation fails because prisoners are not generally taught 
the job-finding and job-holding skills that a functional member of society 
requires.189  From the conservative perspective, punishment fails because 
prisoners are given many of the luxuries of a free person and therefore 
are not made to pay for their crime.190  At this point, no model satisfies 
either side of the spectrum, and prison costs continue to increase with 
each model.191 
In contrast to the lease model, the contract and piece-price models do 
not obviously violate any constitutional provisions.192  Assuming prison 
administrators attend to the welfare of prisoners without deliberate 
indifference—historically a difficult accusation to prove—they are not 
inflicting cruel or unusual punishment.193  Based on the case history 
                                                 
186 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that prison administrators take on 
the job of foreman as well because they supervise the prisoners’ quality of work).  See also 
ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (explaining that while the contractor may send inspectors 
to ensure quality control, they are not foremen in any sense of the word, as the government 
is ultimately responsible for management). 
187 See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 94–95.  The growing industrial belt of the early 1880s, 
encompassing states from Massachusetts to Illinois, was the first region to organize against 
prison labor.  Id. at 94.  By 1887, all states in the industrial belt, except Indiana, set up 
commissions to investigate the effects of prison labor on the free market.  Id.  See also Sexton 
et al., supra note 48, at 1 (describing Congress’ attempt to limit prison manufacturing 
through “anti-contract” clauses in the early 1900s). 
188 See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (the system fails to sufficiently reform or 
punish); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 160 (most of the failures of the contract system 
apply with equal force to the piece-price model). 
189 See supra note 122 (prison administrators are now trying to implement programs that 
prepare prisoners for the world outside by employing them at jobs at which they could 
continue upon parole and by teaching them useful job skills beyond the unskilled menial 
labor performed in the past). 
190 See supra Part II.D (discussing continuing public discontent with the treatment of 
prisoners, centering on a belief that prison life is “too easy”). 
191 See supra notes 162–90 (noting that each model fails to satisfy any objective of 
imprisonment completely, and explaining that as government retains more control over 
prisoners, the cost of imprisonment rises). 
192 See infra notes 193–94 (indicating that based on the high hurdles prisoners must 
overcome and the low administration standards the Court accepts, the contract and piece-
price systems would likely withstand constitutional scrutiny, despite their wisdom as 
prison labor policies). 
193 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98–108 (1976).  In Estelle, the Court concluded that 
the conduct alleged in the prisoner’s claim must be egregious, as even a botched execution 
attempt does not constitute deliberate indifference but simply “an innocent misadventure.”  
Id.; see also discussion supra note 85 (connecting the execution attempt in Resweber to the 
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discussed in Part II, even a warden’s serious negligence in attending to 
injuries incurred as a result of the private contractor’s negligence will not 
rise to the level of deliberate indifference.194 
A truly successful public-account system, the fourth model of prison 
labor, would cripple the free labor market, which is perhaps why the 
system has never been seriously considered.195  The monetary incentives 
of such a model are nonexistent because, while the piece-price model 
may be operated at a real profit for the government, the public-account 
model would be virtually impossible to operate for a real profit.196  First, 
the cost of administration is further increased because the government 
has to hire more specialized prison employees.197  Second, there are still 
no real incentives for prisoners to work hard, unless the model is run for 
non-monetary profit.198 
Non-monetary profit is achieved by implementing a wholehearted 
reformation program for prisoners.199  Giving prisoners an opportunity 
to take pride in the product and learn a new skill, while maintaining the 
penalties normally associated with disobedience in a penitentiary, allows 
                                                                                                             
negligent medical care in Estelle, which resulted from a heavy bail of cotton falling on, and 
injuring, a prisoner). 
194 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98–108 (holding that a prisoner who was injured by a six 
hundred pound bail of cotton, and who subsequently returned to work, did not have a 
section 1983 claim because the treatment did not amount to deliberate indifference). 
195 See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (noting that the public-account system 
removes private parties from the production process but allows them to purchase the 
finished product on the open market).  See also ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 161 (defining the 
public-account system as a closed system).  Certain industries were virtually eliminated in 
the free market because of such success as a prison industry.  Id. 
196 See id. (hypothesizing that the reason the system could not be operated at a profit is 
because the prison employees would be higher-paid); infra notes 197–98 and accompanying 
text (explaining particular problems with the system, including the need to hire specialized 
wardens and a lack of motivation for prisoners). 
197 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 162 (while the traditional warden’s sole profession is 
to manage prisoners as prisoners, a warden under the public-account system would also 
need business and trade knowledge to manage prisoners as employees); see also supra note 
144 (two United States commissions in the early Twentieth century “frown[ed]” on the 
system, which helped lead to its decline). 
198 See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3 (the third example of a hybrid program in 
Minnesota draws on this model and runs without the expectation of profit, but for the 
benefit of the prisoners); supra note 122 (the Minnesota hybrid program teaches prisoners a 
skill, namely assembling computer processors, that they can apply to work after 
imprisonment). 
199 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the myriad benefits of prison 
labor programs and the government’s renewed interest in them); see also supra note 115 (the 
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program enables prisons to apply for 
certificates that allow them to sell their products interstate, thus circumventing Congress’s 
earlier use of the Commerce Clause to prevent the sale of prison-made goods). 
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for a real possibility of reform.200  However, success of such a program 
hinges on the public’s acceptance of the resulting loss of profit.  
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to imagine a contemporary system able 
to market incredibly inexpensive products to the public, while 
simultaneously reinforcing the positive impact the products will have on 
society.201 
Fifth, the state-use model has the same monetary drawbacks and 
non-monetary incentives as the public-account model.202  The free labor 
market would undoubtedly favor this system because it no longer has to 
compete with cheap prison-made goods marketed to the same potential 
consumers.203  However, with the growing number of prisons being built 
and maintained, private contracts for prison construction, maintenance, 
and supply have become big business and certain special interests would 
likely lobby to keep those contracts on the free market, as opposed to 
delegating them to be handled within the prison itself.204 
The Indiana example discussed previously, in which the Indiana 
governor’s office commissioned a prison woodworking shop to build a 
new table for the office, illustrates the benefits of the state-use model 
because the prisoners created a product of which they were proud while 
obtaining a skill.205  Furthermore, the governor’s office not only acquired 
a piece of functional art for a great price, but it also became a positive 
symbol of what imprisonment in the new millennium could yield.206 
                                                 
200 See supra note 148 and accompanying text for an example of an Indiana prison project 
that was non profit-making, but had non-monetary benefits for the prisoners and the state.  
See also Miller, supra note 112 (discussing the federal government’s reinvestigation of prison 
labor and its possible benefits). 
201 See supra note 122 (indicating that several states have reintroduced prison labor 
programs that are designed to accommodate the private sector through purchasing, 
investing, or other means, in an attempt to reduce market friction). 
202 See Garvey, supra note 46, at 344–45 (noting that the state-use model is very similar to 
the public-account system in that it builds on the increased government involvement of the 
public-account system by calling for state agencies to be the sole purchasers of the prison-
manufactured products). 
203 See supra note 145 (explaining that the system was so favored by the public that by 
1940 the state-use system was the dominant model for prison labor). 
204 See supra note 146 (noting that, generally, the state is required to purchase their goods 
from the prison unless the prison cannot fill the request); see also ROBINSON, supra note 47, 
at 161 (noting that, in contrast to prisons, jails do not usually employ the state-use system 
because they are numerous and generally decentralized, whereas the state-use model 
requires centralization, planning, and organization among prison entities). 
205 See supra note 148 (explaining that the Indiana governor’s office commissioned a 
prison woodworking shop to create a new table for the office). 
206 See supra note 148 (noting that the table depicted the shape of Indiana and the prison 
workers inlaid each county with a different piece of wood found only in the state). 
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The sixth and final traditional model, the public-works-and-ways 
model, is as imperfect as the other models.207  The largest drawback of a 
public-works-and-ways system is the state’s transportation and 
administration costs associated with bringing and supervising the 
prisoners on the jobsite, instead of in the confines of a prison.208  Despite 
these difficulties, in 1995, Alabama became the first state in nearly half a 
century to employ the use of chain gangs for public works.209  Since 1995, 
other states such as Florida and Michigan have reinstituted the chain 
gang as well.210  Chain gangs satisfy the public desire for tangible 
punishment by creating a visible display of retribution on, for example, 
the side of a state highway.211 
Although Alabama’s form of the public-works-and-ways system has 
spawned considerable debate about its constitutionality and wisdom, or 
lack thereof, other forms of the system could be much more beneficial to 
                                                 
207 See ROBINSON, supra note 47, at 168 (the public-works-and-ways model is essentially a 
state-use system that only employs prisoners to work government projects).  The public-
works-and-ways model focuses prison labor on public projects such as building or 
repairing roads, “draining swamps,” or “reforesting devastated areas.”  Id. at 169. 
208 See id. at 167–68.  Robinson cites several arguments for the system, including an 
improvement in prisoner health from working outside and the ease with which the prisons 
can acquire appropriations for public projects.  Id. 
209 See Morley, supra note 115, at Features, and Ozimek, supra note 116, at 763 (describing 
the growing phenomenon of chain gangs in Alabama, Florida, and Wisconsin, to name a 
few states). 
210 See Peloso, supra note 116, at 1459–60.  The public sees prisons as affording inmates 
too many luxuries:  cable television, exercise facilities, and libraries to name a few.  Id.  The 
main driving force for the reintroduction of chain gangs is the legislators’ responses to the 
public’s perception that prison is a “cake-walk” and is not retributive enough.  Id. at 1460–
62. 
211 See Interview, supra note 4 (Sheriff Joe Arpaio believes strongly that shame can serve 
as a punishment and an incentive to reform).  The prisoners are therefore at the forefront of 
drivers’ minds, and the drivers’ gawking causes shame and embarrassment for the 
prisoners.  Id.  In fact, many politicians proudly say that shame and embarrassment are 
main objectives of the chain-gang.  Id.  States like Alabama, concededly for ulterior 
purposes, have employed the chain-gang method of supervision.  Id.; Morley, supra note 
115, at Features (Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama uses primarily repeat 
offenders or other inmates that have already been stripped of other privileges).  Like chain 
gangs of the early Twentieth century, prisoners wear bright colored or striped jumpsuits 
and are connected together in groups of twenty to thirty by chains and shackles.  Id.  See 
also Cohen, supra note 115 (describing the sight of the chain gang workers); Jeanne Martha 
Perreault, Chain Gang Narratives and the Politics of "Speaking For," 24 U. HAW. PRESS 152, 152 
(2001).  The shackles used on chain gangs of the early Twentieth century would rub on 
prisoners’ ankles, creating sores known as “shackle poison.”  Perreault at 152.  Currently, at 
least one prison guard, who is usually armed with a shotgun, supervises each gang.  Id.; 
Morley, supra note 115, at Features (describing Alabama’s renewed use of chain gangs).  
One can see how this sight would burn an image in the onlooker’s mind and also cause 
shame and embarrassment to the prisoner.  Id.  See generally Cullen, supra note 45 
(discussing the possibility of successful reformation and rehabilitation). 
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the state, the prisoners, and the public.212  For example, the use of chains 
to connect prisoners is completely unnecessary in a practical sense and, 
when used contemporarily, can only be seen as a political gimmick.213  
Furthermore, weapons technology has advanced since the early 
twentieth century to include a wide variety of effective yet non-lethal 
arms, rendering firearms unnecessary to maintain control over 
workers.214 
Aside from the lease and contract models, the remaining models do 
not pose serious constitutional concerns, assuming they are administered 
according to the standards the Court has set forth.215  In fact, the models 
would work most successfully when they exceed the Court’s 
expectations.216  Historically, the Court has deferred a great deal to the 
wisdom of prison administrators absent clear abuses of power.217  The 
Court has accepted and affirmed time after time—even in the new 
millennium—that the standard of care the Court requires of prison 
administrators is very low in order to pass constitutional muster.218  
Moreover, with respect to prisoners’ due process rights, the Court has 
relied, especially since 1995, on internal grievance procedures to filter 
out the frivolous claims and bring serious violations to the surface.219 
                                                 
212 See infra Part IV text and accompanying notes (proposing a new model code for the 
operation of prison labor). 
213 See Mireya Navarro, Florida to Resume Chain Gangs: Rules on Shackles are Criticized, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 21, 1995), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? 
res=9B02E3DD1339F932A15752C1A963958260 (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (corrections 
specialists have differing views on the purpose and utility of chaining prisoners together). 
214 See Lev Grossman, Beyond the Rubber Bullet, TIME MAGAZINE (Jul. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,322588,00.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2008).  There are many alternatives to the traditional firearm.  Id.  For example, tail-
stabilized bean-bag guns and sponge guns deliver a powerful punch to the recipient 
without the possibility of breaking the recipient’s limbs.  Id.  Other cutting edge methods of 
non-lethal force include heat guns, which deliver a powerful burning feeling without 
actually burning the skin, and deployable Kevlar nets, which immobilize an individual 
without injuring him.  Id. 
215 See supra Part II.C (explaining the guidelines the Court has used since the industrial 
revolution, including the “evolving standards of decency” and “deliberate indifference” 
tests). 
216 See infra Part IV.B (presenting new models of prison labor that attempt to cure the 
failures of traditional models while exceeding Constitutional expectations). 
217 See supra Parts II.A, II.C.4 (discussing the deference accorded to prison administrators 
under various circumstances). 
218 See supra Parts II.C.4, II.D (examining the deliberate indifference standard and its 
application to different constitutional challenges prisoners have raised). 
219 See supra note 114 (defining the Prison Litigation Reformation Act and its 
requirements); Morley, supra note 115, at Features.  To exemplify the Court’s return to the 
hands-off doctrine, consider that the Alabama chain gangs, despite their controversy, have 
not been held unconstitutional.  Id.; supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (stating that 
the Supreme Court has not decided the constitutionality of chain gangs).   
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Each of the six models has been tested by society and deemed at 
least a partial failure at some point in history.220  Instead of discarding 
the old models completely, a more modest and perhaps successful 
approach would be to take the benefits of each system, test them against 
constitutional problems, and combine them to create a new model that 
will satisfy the punishment, rehabilitative, and constitutional objectives 
of imprisonment.221 
IV.  PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND MODEL CODE FOR PRISON LABOR 
PROGRAMS 
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.  
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the 
mischief which gave it birth.222 
 
By combining the best aspects of each of the six models with a new 
perspective of constitutionality, a new model Code can be constructed as 
a template for federal, state, and municipal legislatures to adopt.223  The 
Code must take into account the direction in which the country appears 
to be moving and the possible future of the definition “evolving 
standards of decency” to survive enduring constitutional scrutiny.224  It 
must also provide for sufficient economic and non-economic successes to 
sustain itself in the public forum and ultimately avoid political 
backlash.225  This Note asserts that the tools to create a successful prison 
labor model are readily available in the existing models of prison labor 
as well as existing jurisprudential doctrine regarding prisoners’ rights, 
and proposes a new uniform Code for such a model.226 
                                                 
220 See supra Part III (analyzing the six models and the reasons they have failed 
historically). 
221 See infra Part IV (proposing a new model code containing prison labor systems that 
are beneficial to the government, and the prisoner, and would also meet the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional tests). 
222 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
223 See infra Part IV.B (proposing a new model code of prison labor). 
224 See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (concerning the “evolving standards of decency” test 
propounded in Trop). 
225 See supra Part II.C (discussing the fickle public attitude toward prisons and criminals). 
226 See infra Part IV.B (proposing an integrated model of prison labor).  Regarding this 
Note’s proposed statutory language, current statutory language is denoted in regular font, 
proposed deletions are denoted in strikethrough font, and additions are denoted in 
italicized font. 
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A. Congress Should Amend 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(1)227 
Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(1) as follows: 
(c) In addition to the exceptions set forth in subsection 
(b) of this section, this chapter shall not apply to 
goods, wares, or merchandise manufactured, 
produced, or mined by convicts or prisoners who─ 
(1) are participating in─one of not more than 50 
80 non-Federal prison work pilot projects 
designated by the Director of the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance228 
Commentary 
This addition loosens the limitations on the movement of prison-
made goods through interstate commerce.229  Given that the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance has already issued 41 of 50 certificates, Congress 
should authorize the issuance of more certificates to qualifying 
jurisdictions, which would further the expansion of work programs that 
produce prison-made goods.230 
B. Proposed Model Prison Labor Code231 
The following Model Prison Labor Code (“MPLC”) should be 
implemented:232 
 
                                                 
227 See 18 U.S.C. §1761(c)(1) (2000).  18 U.S.C. § 1761 was originally called the Justice 
System Improvement Act of 1979.  See id. 
228 Id.  The author of this Note proposes to delete the language that is denoted with a 
strikethrough and replace it with the language in italics. 
229 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing federal laws regulating the 
movement of prison-manufactured goods in interstate commerce). 
230 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program 
(PIECP), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/ 
piecp.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). 
231 Unless otherwise noted, this Code’s language is the unique idea of the author of this 
Note.  Furthermore, this proposed Code does not build on any past legislation or formal 
policy, but is a compilation of the traditional labor models set forth in Part II.E.  However, 
the idea of a hybrid model of prison labor has been introduced in several states, and is 
discussed supra, note 122.  Essentially, this Code is merely a skeleton of what could be 
developed into a detailed manual for successful operation of prison labor programs. 
232 The goal of the Section One mission statement and qualifications is to delineate the 
requirements for prisoners to enter the programs, and set the standards that prisoners are 
required to follow in order to remain in the programs. 
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MPLC § 1-100 Goals of Prison Labor 
 
The goals of all prison labor programs are as follows: 
(a) To serve the community by releasing inmates who are better 
prepared to be productive, law abiding members of society. 
(b) To serve inmates by teaching them valuable skills and work 
habits, and by making them disciplined and productive. 
(c) To serve the Jurisdiction by generating revenue to reduce 
costs associated with imprisonment. 
(d) To serve society at large by carrying out the sentence 
imposed by the Judicial system in a strict, yet meaningful, 
way. 
 
MPLC § 1-102 Prisoner Grievance Procedure233 
 
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), prisoners shall exhaust administrative 
remedies before filing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.234  The 
complaining prisoner shall be entitled to the following: 
(a) written notice of violations; 
(b) access to any and all evidence against him regarding the 
written notice of violation; 
(c) an opportunity to present his case, including the 
opportunity to present evidence, witnesses, and rebuttal to 
State’s evidence, to a neutral panel of fact-finders; 
(d) access to the written decision of the fact-finders  before or 
immediately following revocation of a prisoner’s status or 
privileges. 
 
MPLC § 1-103 Qualifications for Participation in Prison Labor Programs 
 
All general population prisoners shall work in some capacity unless they 
are medically disqualified, as determined by a medical professional.  The 
Department of Corrections or its organizations shall determine the 
percentage of time each prisoner shall spend per week in work 
programs, educational programs, and treatment programs.  The total 
amount of time spent in the combined programs shall not exceed forty 
hours per week, per prisoner. 
 
                                                 
233 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (providing the text and explanation of the 
Prison Litigation Reformation Act). 
234 See Suits by Prisoners, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000).  See supra note 83 for the text of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 regarding civil actions for deprivation of rights. 
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MPLC § 1-104 Qualifications for Participation in Work Release or Work 
Furlough Programs 
 
(a) Each prison in the Jurisdiction shall have either a work 
release or work furlough program, or both. 
(b) Minimum security prisoners incarcerated for a nonviolent 
offense may petition the Department of Community 
Corrections for admission to a work release or work 
furlough program when they have not more than twelve 
months of their sentence, including good time credit, 
remaining. 
(c) The Department of Community Corrections shall have sole 
discretion over admission into work release programs. 
(d) The Department of Community Corrections shall: 
(1) notify applicants within thirty days of their acceptance 
or denial; 
(2) provide an explanation of why applicants were denied 
and whether they are qualified to apply again if they 
complete clearly outlined requirements (such as further 
job training); 
(3) place accepted applicants in a qualified work release 
program, supervised by a Community Corrections 
Officer within sixty days of acceptance; 
(4) establish procedures for Community Corrections 
Officers to periodically evaluate work release prisoners 
including, but not limited to: 
(i) requiring prisoners to make and follow a detailed 
daily schedule; 
(ii) requiring regular drug testing; and 
(iii) requiring prisoners to abide by a curfew, the 
violation of which will initiate re-evaluation by 
Community Corrections Officers for the fitness of 
the prisoners to continue in the program. 
 
MPLC § 1-105 Qualifications for Participation in Shock Incarceration 
Programs 
 
Inmates may participate in shock incarceration programs on a voluntary 
basis if: 
(a) the instant offense is their first felony conviction; and  
(b) they are sentenced to not more than seven years in a 
Jurisdiction prison; and 
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(c) the Jurisdiction Probation Department Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report, the sentencing court, and the 
Department of Corrections unanimously recommend a 
Shock Incarceration Program. 
 
Commentary 
The mission statement of the Code is important because it establishes 
that the Code is meant to satisfy goals of retribution and rehabilitation.  
The Code is designed to give administrators flexibility in imposing labor 
requirements while still providing a structure within which to adhere.  
Therefore, strict requirements are set forth outlining that, generally, 
prisoners must work, but that not all prisoners are suitable for all 
programs.  Finally, because the Court has held that prisoners are 
guaranteed a minimum level of due process before or immediately 
following disciplinary action, the Code includes a section specifically 
dedicated to grievance procedures.235 
 
MPLC § 2-201 Prisoner Status—Level Three236 
 
(a) All prisoners shall enter as level three inmates on either 
maximum or medium security status.  Level three inmates 
are afforded only basic provisions meeting constitutional 
protections and are allowed limited additional amenities 
solely in the discretion of the prison administrators.  Level 
three inmates shall work for the benefit of the Jurisdiction on 
public works projects or prison projects in controlled inmate 
groups and shall abide by the rules of said groups, or be 
subject to discipline from prison administrators. 
(b) All level three inmates shall wear pink jumpsuits displaying 
the prisoner’s identification number and the statute number 
under which he was convicted. 
(c) All level three inmates are expected to progress to level two 
status within six months of intake; however, prison 
                                                 
235 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972).  Morrissey outlined the 
procedures to which prisoners are entitled.  Id.  This Code includes those procedures 
needed to satisfy constitutional guarantees as outlined by the Court. 
236 Creating different levels of status is deliberately reminiscent of the caste system, 
which is of questionable success in a free society but would be useful in a controlled society 
as both a motivation to comply with the rules and a tool for punishment for those 
individuals who do not comply.  See CHRISTIANSON, supra note 47, at 179 (discussing the 
prisoner status level system employed at Elmira Reformatory). 
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administrators have sole discretion as to the status level of 
inmates. 
 
MPLC § 2-202 Prisoner Status—Level Two 
(a) Prisoners may spend up to ninety percent of their 
incarceration as level two inmates. 
(b) Level two inmates shall wear brightly colored jumpsuits to 
distinguish them from other levels of inmates, which shall 
include their identification numbers, but no other 
information. 
(c) Prisoners may enjoy increased access to amenities as 
determined by prison administrators, including, but not 
limited to: 
(1) increased television, telephone, radio, library, and 
internet access; 
(2) increased access to exercise equipment; and 
(3) increased out-of-cell visiting time. 
(d) All prisoners obtaining level two status shall: 
(1) work in one of the available work programs within the 
Jurisdiction unless they are disqualified for a medical 
reason as determined by a medical professional; 
(2)  continue educational, vocational, and treatment 
programming;  
(3) commit a minimal amount of infractions as determined 
by the prison administrator; and 
(4) show progress as determined by the prison 
administrator. 
(e) Level two inmates may progress to level one status as 
determined by the prison administrators. 
 
MPLC § 2-203 Prisoner Status—Level One 
 
(a) All level one inmates are classified as minimum security 
status. 
(b) Level one inmates have demonstrated the ability to behave 
as a member of a community and are thus treated as closely 
to a member of the community as is possible in an 
institutional setting.  Accordingly, level one inmates enjoy a 
list of benefits including, but not limited to: 
(1) greatest access to amenities; 
(2) greatest out-of-cell time; 
(3) opportunities for the highest paying jobs; and 
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(4) opportunities for work release and work furlough 
programs. 
(c) Level one inmates shall wear brightly colored jumpsuits to 
distinguish them from other levels of inmates, which shall 
display their name and identification number, but no other 
information. 
 
Commentary 
 
Creating status levels for prisoners that are easily identifiable to both 
corrections officers and other inmates intentionally creates segregation in 
the prison community.  As compared to a caste system, level three 
inmates are treated with less respect than level two inmates, and so 
forth.  While this system is retributive, shaming, and possibly 
embarrassing for inmates by printing their offenses clearly on their 
apparel, it also reinforces a desire for upward mobility that will translate 
into a similar desire outside prison walls. 
Importantly, the outlined treatment of level three inmates satisfies 
the mandates of the Court in its interpretation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it is clearly related to overarching 
penological objectives.  Of course, the actual implementation of the 
system may result in some acts of unnecessary and wanton conduct by 
renegade corrections officers, but that risk is inherent in any corrections 
facility and does not discount the true intention of the Code.237 
 
MPLC § 3-301 Limitations on Prison Work Programs238 
Individual prisons are not limited to any of the work programs defined 
in this Code.  Institutions may create work programs as it sees fit to 
further the goals set forth in this Code and to the extent allowed under 
law. 
Commentary 
 
The purpose of Section 3-301 is to reinforce the need for flexibility 
within each institution.  Each correctional facility is different not only in 
the prison population, but in the capability for industry within the 
facility, as well as in the surrounding market conditions.  Prison 
                                                 
237 See supra notes 94 & 101 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes 
constitutionally prohibited conduct by corrections officers). 
238 The goal of this provision is to make clear that this Code is not all-inclusive.  States 
should be encouraged to experiment with hybrids of all existing models and to invent new 
models. 
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administrators must be given deference in deciding what programs best 
fit their institutions.  However, the author of this Note presents this Code 
containing a wide variety of programs, all of which could be successful 
when applied to the correct environment.239  The ultimate goal of the 
Code is to institute enough programs in each institution so that every 
general population prisoner is laboring in some capacity. 
 
MPLC § 4-401 Shock Incarceration Programs 
 
Shock Incarceration programs shall be designed to fit each individual 
institution’s needs, but shall incorporate the following elements: 
(a) military boot camp-style discipline and training; 
(b) a strictly regimented schedule; 
(c) clearly defined rules and penalties; 
(b) mentally and physically demanding labor; and 
(e) cognitive skills training. 
Shock Incarceration programs shall be evaluated by the Jurisdiction 
Department of Corrections if it exceeds a thirty percent drop out rate or 
falls below a ten percent drop out rate. 
 
Commentary 
The Shock Incarceration Program outlined in this Code closely 
parallels the Federal shock incarceration program approved in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4046.240 
 
MPLC § 5-501 Public Sector Programs Definition241 
 
Section Five labor models shall be completely funded, operated, 
managed, and evaluated by the Jurisdiction Department of Corrections.  
All laborers for this model shall be medium security inmates from the 
general prison population.  All laborers work on either a good-time 
reduction incentive program, or a piece-price system in which inmates 
are paid per unit of product they complete.  Laborers are not required to 
use any of their wages to recoup the costs of their incarceration. 
 
                                                 
239 See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3 (providing examples of pilot programs showing 
success). 
240 See supra note 118 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Shock 
Incarceration Program. 
241 See supra Parts II.E & III (the public sector models draw on, and expands upon, the 
state-use and public-works-and-ways models of prison labor explained in Part II.E and 
analyzed in Part III). 
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MPLC § 5-502 Controlled Inmate Group Public Works Program 
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any 
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction. 
(b) Inmates shall be transported in groups, not to exceed twenty 
inmates per group, to public property for the purpose of 
conducting maintenance. 
(c) One corrections officer shall be responsible for one group of 
inmates. 
(d) Inmates shall wear brightly colored work-clothes for the 
purposes of identification, displaying the inmate’s 
identification number, and in addition, a printed or graphic 
message, approved by Jurisdiction Department of 
Correction, aimed at deterring and preventing crime. 
(e) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in all safe 
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break 
for lunch and four fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the 
work day. 
(f) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the 
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures upon return 
to the prison including, but not limited to, a loss of any 
privileges. 
(g) Any inmate that attempts to escape the group while in the 
course of a work day shall be subdued and captured using 
non-lethal force and shall face serious disciplinary measures 
when returned to the prison. 
 
MPLC § 5-503 Controlled Inmate Group Prison Works Program 
 
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any 
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction. 
(b) Inmates shall be assigned in groups, each group consisting 
of five to twenty inmates, to work in various areas within the 
prison and for the benefit of the prison.  Areas of work 
include, but are not limited to: 
(1) canteen cleaning and food service; 
(2) prison landscaping; 
(3) prison laundry; 
(4) prison farming of hogs, beef, poultry, and vegetables for 
prison consumption; 
(5) construction of prison facilities; 
(6) woodworking or metalworking for the benefit of the 
prison facilities; and 
Riederer: Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment Through an Integra
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1478 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
(7) other prison maintenance. 
(c) Inmates shall wear a designated color of work clothes, 
displaying either their identification numbers or their names 
to distinguish them from other inmates. 
(d) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in safe 
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break 
for lunch and two fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the 
work day. 
(e) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the 
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures including, 
but not limited to, a loss of any privileges. 
 
MPLC § 5-504 Controlled Inmate Group Private Sector Purchaser 
Program 
 
(a) The Controlled Inmate Group Program shall substitute any 
and all forms of “chain gang” in Jurisdiction. 
(b) The Department of Corrections prison industry shall 
produce all goods and services for the benefit of one private 
sector purchaser on the open market. 
(c) The private sector purchaser shall maintain a contract with 
the prison facility for a fixed term to be renewed at the 
purchaser’s desire. 
(d) The private sector purchaser shall have insubstantial 
financial or managerial interest in the industry. 
(e) Unconventional corrections officers may be employed that 
have special knowledge of the industry and can act as 
foremen.  Unconventional corrections officers shall not be a 
substitute for traditionally trained corrections officers. 
(f) Inmates shall work for eight hours in one day in safe 
working weather conditions, taking one thirty minute break 
for lunch and two fifteen minute rest breaks throughout the 
workday. 
(g) Inmates shall perform the duties as assigned by the 
corrections officer or face disciplinary measures including, 
but not limited to, a loss of any privileges. 
 
Commentary 
The term “controlled inmate group” includes level two or level three 
inmates who pose a security risk.  Despite the constitutionality of the 
traditional “chain gang,” new technology makes chaining even high-risk 
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prisoners together unnecessary.242  Because the retributive component of 
incarceration is satisfied in other ways throughout the Code, the sole 
purpose of the use of weapons is for safety. 
These model statutory provisions maintain a closed-market prison 
model in which prisoners perform labor directly for the prison, and 
solely for the prison’s benefit.  They are most suited for prisons without 
the facilities to set up large production centers.  Furthermore, these 
models are most profitable when coupled with strong incentives for 
prisoners to work hard, such as a reduction of sentence. 
 
MPLC § 6-601 Private Sector Models Definition243 
 
Section Six labor models may be funded publicly by the Jurisdiction, 
privately by businesses, or by both.  All laborers for this model shall be 
medium security inmates from the general prison population.  All 
laborers work for either minimum wage, or the market value of their 
work.  Their rate of payment shall be governed by the legislation of 
Jurisdiction.  Laborers are required to use a portion of their wages to 
recoup the costs of their incarceration.  A laborer’s wages are to be 
distributed as follows: 
Thirty-three percent (33%) shall be paid directly to the Jurisdiction 
Department of Corrections to offset costs of room and board. 
Five percent (5%) shall be paid to the Jurisdiction agency in charge of 
Jurisdiction’s victim assistance program. 
Any previously court-ordered support for spouses or dependants 
shall be paid out of the laborer’s wages, not applying to arrears or 
accruing with interest. 
Any remaining portion may be kept by the laborer to use as he 
chooses, unless monetary penalties have been assessed by the prison, in 
which case that amount shall be deducted from laborer’s wages in equal 
amounts each pay period until paid, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of 
the total earned per period. 
 
MPLC § 6-602 Private Sector Investing 
 
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from investing in 
prison industries, without further obligation to the prison.  The 
                                                 
242 See Grossman, supra note 214 (presenting alternatives to chains and shackles, such as 
tail stabilized bean-bag guns, sponge guns, and nets). 
243 See supra note 122 (describing test programs in several states).  The private sector 
models in this Code are loosely based on the lease, contract, piece-price, and public-account 
models explained in Part II.E.  See Sexton et al., supra note 48, at 3.  The Code also 
incorporates hybrid models that some states are currently testing.  Id. 
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businesses shall have no guarantee of profitable return of their money 
and may withdraw their investment at any time. 
 
MPLC § 6-603 Private Sector Management of Prison Industry 
 
Private Sector businesses shall not be prohibited from managing 
prison industries without further obligation or involvement in the 
industry. 
 
MPLC § 6-604 Private Sector Ownership of Prison Industry 
 
Private Sector businesses shall not be prohibited from owning prison 
industries, regardless of whether they are the dominant purchaser of 
goods.  The business shall have exclusive management of aspects of the 
business including, but not limited to: 
(a) hiring and firing; 
(b) acceptable standards of work required of prison employees; and 
(c) production. 
 
MPLC § 6-605 Joint Private and Public Ownership 
 
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from joining with 
Jurisdiction Department of Corrections Facilities in forming a business 
partnership.  The private sector business shall be responsible for 
management of the joint venture to the extent it is a partner.  The 
applicable laws of Jurisdiction will govern such a partnership. 
 
MPLC § 6-606 Dominant Purchaser Private Sector Partner 
 
Private sector businesses shall not be prohibited from being both a 
partner with Jurisdiction Department of Correction Facilities and the 
dominant purchaser of goods produced. 
 
Commentary 
These model statutory provisions, designed for use with level two 
inmates, seek to mend the fences between the public and private sector.  
By allowing the widest variety of private sector involvement, 
jurisdictions have options for the program that present the least friction 
with free labor, while also presenting the greatest opportunity for profit.  
Furthermore, prisoners are offsetting the cost of their own incarceration 
by paying one-third of their wages to the Department of Corrections. 
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The benefits to prisoners are also abundant.  Most importantly, the 
risk of constitutional violations of prisoners’ rights is very low because 
inmates are under the joint control of the public and private sector.  
Second, prisoners learn to manage their money in a basic way by being 
forced to apportion it according to the Code.  Third, prisoners may learn 
valuable job-seeking skills because private sector businesses using prison 
labor may require actual applications and interviews before hiring.  
Fourth, prisoners have the opportunity to work in one industry for a 
longer period of time and learn the skills of that industry, which will 
allow them to pursue working in that industry after their release from 
incarceration. 
This Code is a basic template for a more integrated model of prison 
labor.  The Court, through its interpretation of what constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, allows wide latitude for the implementation of 
programs aimed at retribution and rehabilitation.244  It is unwise and 
untrue to maintain that the two ideals cannot function together, just as it 
is unwise and untrue to maintain that free labor and forced labor cannot 
coexist. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current statistics surrounding many aspects of imprisonment in 
the United States demonstrate that the current system is unacceptable.245  
In fact, if the current trends continue, this nation’s leaders will have to 
make difficult decisions about how to imprison, who to imprison, and 
how much can be spent on imprisonment.  However, the current trends 
do not have to continue, as this Note has suggested. 
This Note recounted the history of prisoners’ rights in America from 
the establishment of the Republic to the present.246  Furthermore, it 
analyzed the constitutional principles expounded in history as applied to 
labor in correctional institutions.247  Finally, it proposed to balance the 
goals of imprisonment with constitutional protections through a model 
that requires all general population prisoners to work as part of their 
punishment and reform.248 
                                                 
244 See supra Part III (concluding that the tests the Supreme Court has applied to 
determine the constitutionality of prison conditions are generally easy for the government 
to satisfy). 
245 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text for a brief list of pertinent statistics. 
246 See supra Part II (discussing the case law surrounding the treatment of prisoners). 
247 See supra Part III.B (applying constitutional standards to traditional prison labor 
models). 
248 See supra Part IV.B (laying out a framework for an integrated model of prison labor). 
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In summary, the four pillars of imprisonment—punishment, 
retribution, rehabilitation, and reform—do not have to be in opposition, 
butting up against constitutional protections and public desires.  In fact, 
the four can all be satisfied through new models of prison labor that 
benefit the state, the prisoner, and private interests.  The Eighth 
Amendment grew out of fear of excruciating and inhumane punishment.  
It has metamorphosed into perhaps the only Amendment that ensures 
both protection and punishment for prisoners.  The new model Code 
proposed in this Note embraces the duality of the Eighth Amendment 
and uses it to create a positive and integrated system of prison labor, 
hopefully retiring the historical friction surrounding imprisonment in 
the United States. 
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